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ABSTRACT
Critics have long decried the Fourth Amendment’s lack of an
adequate remedy to secure its compliance. Neither the exclusionary
rule nor the threat of civil liability deters police misconduct, leaving
scholars to cast about for alternative measures. The emphasis on
penalties, however, overlooks a different problem: detection. Because
of policing’s fast-paced nature, even so-called “flagrant” Fourth
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Amendment violations trigger insufficient liability due to low
probabilities of detection.
This Article addresses this problem by drawing on the Pigouvian
tax literature. The Pigouvian tax—sometimes referred to as a “cor-
rective tax”—is a pricing instrument imposed by regulators in an
amount equal to the expected harm manufacturers or individuals
impose on others. Like strict liability, the tax forces an actor to in-
ternalize the costs of her activity. 
How well might a Pigouvian tax scheme curtail Fourth Amend-
ment violations—particularly intentional ones? How much better off
would society be, if, in addition to the remedial systems already in
place, it devised an additional system, informed by the vast literature
on corrective taxes and pricing? 
This Article seeks to answer these questions by imagining a scheme
that charges local police departments an annual fee reflecting (a)
their annual volume of search activity; (b) the risk that such activity
includes and conceals purposeful misconduct; and (c) the harm aris-
ing out of such misconduct. The Article further analyzes the various
challenges likely to arise in both the design and implementation of
such a scheme. A pricing approach is no panacea for all that ails the
Fourth Amendment, but it is a potent tool that policymakers would
be foolish to ignore.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment promotes a venerable array of rights,1
but the remedies that purport to protect them leave much to be
desired.2 The exclusionary rule applies to too little police miscon-
duct, and even then, only to that which occurs within the context of
a criminal case.3 For constitutional tort claims arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, qualified immunity doctrines shield individual police
officers from liability.4 Parsimonious theories of group liability ren-
der municipalities and police departments insufficiently unaccount-
able,5 and citywide indemnification programs ensure that individual
police officers rarely, if ever, personally pay for their misconduct.6 
Throughout the past decade, partially in response to tragedies
involving fatal and excessive uses of force,7 policing reform has
1. The Fourth Amendment States,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 585, 633 (2011) (examining the exclusionary rule’s perverse effects); Kit
Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
821, 822 (2013) (criticizing the exclusionary rule’s “lack of analytical rigor”); Christopher
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 365
(concluding that the exclusionary rule “is significantly flawed as a deterrent device”). 
3. See infra Part I.A. 
4. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L.
REV. 207, 250 (2013) (critiquing the “existing law of qualified immunity” as “complicated,
unstable, and overprotective of government officers”).
5. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: Municipal Liability for
State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1506 (1999); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths
and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1067 (2010) (finding that even successful lawsuits often fail to alter
decision-making within police departments).
6. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 937
(2014) (concluding that officers across the country are “virtually always indemnified”).
7. See, e.g., Peter Hermann & Lynh Bui, Man Died of Spinal Injury After Being Arrested
by Baltimore Police, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/
man-died-of-spinal-injury-after-being-arrested-by-baltimore-police/2015/04/20/93014bba-e76f-
11e4-9a6a-c1ab95a0600b_story.html [https://perma.cc/VPM6-LXRT]; Elahe Izadi & Peter
Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice Within Seconds,
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gathered increasing support.8 Change, most everyone seems to
agree, is needed, as demonstrated by President Obama’s much
heralded assembly of his Task Force on 21st Century Policing.9
Scholars have argued for a bolder and more effective exclusionary
rule;10 urged courts to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement;11 and advocated the adoption of technological,12
statutory,13 and administrative tools14 to more effectively regulate
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/
11/26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/
[https://perma.cc/W66G-S692]; Abby Ohlheiser et al., N.Y. Grand Jury Declines to Indict
Officer in Death of Eric Garner, Igniting Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/12/03/8dc55084-7b2b-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html
[https://perma.cc/C2P2-XUZN].
8. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Seth W. Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2754759 [https://perma.cc/
BR22-YLJK].
9. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/
taskforce/taskforce_ finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYD3-4JT2]. Concededly, the 2016
election of Donald Trump to the presidency may well curtail the federal government’s
participation in nationwide police reform. Nevertheless, politicians and judges across state
and federal jurisdictions have strong incentives to erect reforms, particularly where consent
decrees and similar agreements are already in place. See, e.g., John Byrne, Emanuel Says
Police Reforms to Continue Under Trump, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 22, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-trump-met-20161122-story.html [https://
perma.cc/63NY-U4J8]; Steve Miletich, After 4 Years of Seattle Police Reform, Could Trump
‘Let It All Die’?, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016, 6:23 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/politics/seattle-police-reform-locked-down-or-could-trump-let-it-all-die/
[https://perma.cc/7B3P-5B2Y].
10. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1890 (2014) (reorienting the exclusionary rule as a due process right rather than a deterrence
remedy).
11. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2012); David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The
Warrant Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 433 (2016). 
12. MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE
10 (2014), https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%
20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNV2-SLUT].
13. See Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a Legislative Alternative to the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. REV. 949, 951-53 (2010) (setting forth a
statute that would eliminate the exclusionary rule for police departments that adopt internal
compliance measures); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform:
Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351,
383-84 (2011) (proposing statutory limitations on federal spending for police departments that
fail to implement adequate internal controls).
14. See, e.g., Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent
Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 235, 245 (2015) (arguing for state
1108 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1103
the police.15 Although the mechanisms differ, the goals converge on
transforming the American police force into a more professionalized,
internally reflective, and community-based problem-solving institu-
tion.16 
This Article proposes a different, albeit complementary, approach:
a corrective tax designed to “price” Fourth Amendment activity in
order to curtail intentional Fourth Amendment violations.17 How
much better off would society be, if, in addition to the remedial
systems already in place, it devised an additional system informed
by the vast literature on corrective taxes and pricing? Moreover,
how well might this regime complement other reforms?
Imagine some federal agency tabulated and charged local police
departments an annual fee reflecting (a) the volume of search
activity undertaken by police officers in a given year; (b) the risks
that this activity included purposeful violations of the Fourth
Amendment; and (c) the harm created by these violations.18 Would
such a regime internalize Fourth Amendment violations more
effectively than our current highly decentralized, litigation-based
system?19 Would state and local governments alter their policing
investigations of local lethal force cases); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police
Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3237 (2014) (arguing for enhanced oversight by federal
government via 42 U.S.C. § 14141).
15. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762
(2012). 
16. This effort is not new. For a discussion of the policing styles and philosophies that
have emerged over the past half century, see Nick Tilley, Modern Approaches to Policing:
Community, Problem-Oriented and Intelligence-Led, in HANDBOOK OF POLICING 373, 375, 379,
383 (Tim Newburn ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science
of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 339 (2014) (tracing emergence and
convergence of hot-spot policing and broken-windows approaches); Christopher Stone &
Jeremy Travis, Toward a New Professionalism in Policing, 13 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 11,
14 (2013) (describing community and problem-solving oriented policing).
17. This proposal’s primary target—intentional constitutional violations—admittedly is
only a subset of the harms caused by bad policing. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs
and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2015) (criticizing federal
enforcement programs that fail to take into account the costs of “interference with individual
interests in autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, and property” that even constitutional
searches create). 
18. Thus, the scheme would set taxes to equal the expected harm associated with an
unconstitutional search or seizure. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority
of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (arguing that
when actual harm is unknown, corrective taxes “should equal the expected harm”).
19. In economics, an externality is a harm that one party’s activity imposes on another.
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priorities, redesigning them in a way to de-emphasize potentially
unconstitutional searches? And finally, would a pricing regime
render policing’s costs more transparent and amenable to demo-
cratic deliberation?
The argument for a Fourth Amendment pricing regime rests on
two propositions. First, it is far easier to observe a police officer’s
search or seizure of “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”20 than it
is to prove that the search or seizure violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.21 Notwithstanding the emergence of dashboard and body cam-
eras, policing remains a high-paced, decentralized activity wherein
misconduct remains difficult to detect.22 Accordingly, so long as
officers avoid notable misbehavior or excessive violence, many
illegal searches and seizures will remain undetected.23 
The second proposition is that different search activities pose
varying levels of risk. The stop-and-frisk presents a different set of
risks from the search incident to arrest, which in turn differs greatly
from search supported by search warrants, and so forth.24 One of the
aims of this Article is to consider how well a pricing scheme can
leverage these distinctions and move police officers from the riskiest
category of policing towards less risky behavior. 
After delineating the program’s design and implementation
challenges, this Article concludes with a mixed but positive outlook.
Pricing is no panacea, but it improves our current remedial system
by layering an ex ante regulatory program onto the ex post litigation
See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (Transaction Publishers 2002)
(1952) (explaining problems that arise out of positive and negative externalities). This Article
conceptualizes an illegal Fourth Amendment search as an externality imposed on citizens by
the police. For similar approaches, see Aziz Z. Huq, Agency Slack and the Design of Criminal
Justice Institutions, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 238, 240,
(Jonathan Jacobs & Jonathan Jackson eds., 2017) (analyzing police misconduct through the
lenses of institutional design and principal-agent theory); Michael van den Berg, Comment,
Proposing a Transactional Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 871
(2015) (proposing a forfeiture-related rule that “requir[es] police departments to internalize
the externalities they impose on non-consenting parties”). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. Ironically, these are the very characteristics that have inspired the Supreme Court’s
deference. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1-3) (citing and critiquing
the Supreme Court’s deference rhetoric).
23. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1510; see also Slobogin, supra note 2, at 374-75.
24. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4).
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remedies most scholars deem insufficient.25 In addition, it central-
izes and improves data collection,26 while leaving ample room for
local experimentation.27 It does not constrain specific police prac-
tices. Nor does it dictate a particular policing philosophy or style.
Rather, it compels police chiefs and politicians to recognize the costs
associated with their policies and practices.28
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the
Fourth Amendment’s detection problem and its implications for
deterrence. Part II explores the Pigouvian tax literature and con-
siders the tax’s conceptual drawbacks and benefits as applied to
Fourth Amendment violations.29 Part III fleshes out a proposal for
a Fourth Amendment pricing regime and, after analyzing several
design choices, revisits the discussion of benefits with more
specificity. Part IV anticipates likely objections and suggests several
solutions. The Article then concludes. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S DETECTION PROBLEM
Over the past half century, commentators have steadfastly docu-
mented shortfalls in the protection of Fourth Amendment rights.30
25. This Article thus draws on some of the lessons set forth in previous discussions
comparing the exclusionary rule to tort liability. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amend-
ment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786 (1994) (arguing that the Framers intended
a civil damages regime); L. Timothy Perrin et al., An Invitation to Dialogue: Exploring the
Pepperdine Proposal to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 789, 804 (1999);
Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 49-50
(analyzing the relative merits of the exclusionary rule and tort liability); Slobogin, supra note
2, at 390-91 (supporting “judicially administered damages regime” in place of the exclusionary
rule).
26. See Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119,
1122 (2013). 
27. For more on experimentalism and tailored government solutions, see Michael C. Dorf
& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,
314 (1998). 
28. The proposal thus incorporates Professor Tracey Meares’s insight that Fourth Amend-
ment violations stem from “programmatic” choices and not some aggregation of individual
“incidents.” Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of
Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015). 
29. See PIGOU, supra note 19, at 192-95 (describing “bounties and taxes” that the state
may use to correct “divergences” in the net social and private products of any unit of invest-
ment). 
30. See, e.g., Garrett & Staughton, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1-4). For a notable partial
defense of Fourth Amendment doctrine on economic grounds, see generally Orin S. Kerr, An
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The two pillars of Fourth Amendment remedial law receive the bulk
of the criticism, with the exclusionary rule too narrow and § 1983
liability too weak.31 Alternate remedial measures, be they internal
discipline or criminal prosecutions, are spotty and unreliable; no
serious scholar contends they adequately deter Fourth Amendment-
related misconduct.32 Accordingly, one routinely encounters a
familiar argument for interpretive doctrinal relief.33 If the Supreme
Court would reverse course and make the exclusionary rule and civil
liability stronger with more reliable penalties, police misconduct
would (at last) recede.
This Part aims to correct the misimpression that the Fourth
Amendment’s sole problem is a weak penalty. After surveying
conventional critiques,34 this Part will address a much less dis-
cussed problem, the difficulty in detecting Fourth Amendment
violations,35 and will explain why low detection rates are uniquely
problematic for securing Fourth Amendment compliance.36
A. Standard Criticisms: Too Narrow, Too Weak
The exclusionary rule is narrow in several senses of the word: it
applies in only some courtroom settings, protects only some victims,
Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (2016).
31. See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 14, at 3199-200; Slobogin, supra note 2, at 365, 384-86.
32. Alternative measures include internal police discipline, citizen review boards, and
criminal liability for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). For assessments of these remedies,
see, for example, Debra Livingston, Commentary, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 653, 654-57 (2004) (cataloging weaknesses in the citizen review
process); Rushin, supra note 14, at 3202-04 (“[T]he federal government lack[s] the resources
to pursue § 242 prosecutions regularly.”). On the rarity of § 242 criminal prosecutions for
Fourth Amendment violations, see Brian R. Johnson & Phillip B. Bridgmon, Depriving Civil
Rights: An Exploration of 18 U.S.C. 242 Criminal Prosecutions 2001-2006, 34 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 196, 201, 202 tbl.1 (2009) (conducting a five-year empirical analysis of § 242 prosecutions
that yielded 120 cases involving police personnel).
33. For an illustrative example, see generally Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More
Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1208-09 (2012) (criticizing the Roberts Court for
increasingly confining the exclusionary rule to instances of culpable or deliberate police
misconduct); Re, supra note 10, at 1890 (advocating a broader “due process” interpretation of
the exclusionary rule by using the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses together). 
34. See infra Part I.A.
35. See infra Part I.B.
36. See infra Part I.C.
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and punishes only some violations.37 The rule applies at trial only
to evidence submitted during the prosecution’s case in chief.38 It
does not protect victims illegally searched but subsequently un-
charged.39 Nor does it apply in immigration proceedings40 or at
sentencing.41 The rule excludes only that evidence that is not too
“attenuated” from the violation that led to its discovery.42 And it
rescues only those defendants whose personal Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated, and not those who have suffered no
personal injury.43 
Most importantly, in a number of instances, the rule leaves
untouched contraband obtained as a result of “reasonable” mistake
or simple negligence.44 Under such circumstances, prosecutors can
37. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3199-200. The Fourth Amendment’s shortcomings are
oft rehearsed. For a recent recitation of its many doctrinal drawbacks, see id. at 3195-204
(arguing that the exclusionary rule and civil liability have proven inadequate).
38. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 65 (1954). 
39. Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1275, 1323 (2000); Slobogin, supra note 2, at 374-75.
40. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
41. See United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting “egregious
violation” exception to rule that the exclusionary rule does not apply at sentencing); United
States v. Acosta, 303 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]en other circuits have ruled that in most
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of
suppressed evidence during sentencing proceedings.”).
42. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592-93
(2006); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487, 491 (1963). 
43. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 138 (1978) (affirming “personal” nature of
Fourth Amendment rights); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (holding that
Fourth Amendment rights “may not be vicariously asserted”).
44. “[W]hen the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their
conduct is lawful or when their conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence the
‘deterrence rationale loses much of its force,’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay its way.’” Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (first quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909
(1984); then quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009); and then quoting
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 908 n.6). Collectively, these cases comprise the Court’s Fourth
Amendment fault doctrine. See generally Kinports, supra note 2, at 830. After Herring was
first decided, some scholars wondered whether the Fourth Amendment’s fault doctrine would
be limited to instances in which someone other than the arresting police officer made a negli-
gent error. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?,
7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 463-65 (2009) (setting forth broader and narrower interpretations
of Herring); Kay L. Levine et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring World, 106 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10) (analyzing Herring’s attenuation
doctrine as one that separates the mistake from the “primary investigating officer”).
The Supreme Court’s latest foray in this area, however, Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063, rejects
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introduce evidence at trial obtained during stops or arrests that
never should have occurred45 and arising out of a police officer’s
factual errors and “reasonable” misunderstanding of substantive
state law.46 
Civil redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is no more generous.47 Sec-
tion 1983, and its federal analogue, Bivens,48 create private rights
of action against state and federal officers who, while acting under
color of law, deprive individuals of their constitutional rights.49
Nevertheless, individual officers—be they city, state, or federal
employees—enjoy qualified immunity, meaning they cannot be sued
unless their conduct violates “clearly established”50 law that a rea-
sonable officer would have understood.51 Immunity applies regard-
the view that fault must reside in someone other than the arresting officer. In Strieff, the
Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
investigatory stop because the defendant was subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. Id.
Relying on the attenuation doctrine, the Strieff majority concluded that the arrest warrant
separately “compelled” the search and that the officer’s factually unsupported stop “was at
most negligent.” Id.
45. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (permitting evidence obtained through a “negligent”
stop); Herring, 555 U.S. at 137-38, 144 (permitting evidence obtained as of a result of a mis-
taken arrest). 
46. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (holding a search not unreasonable
under Fourth Amendment when based on an officer’s reasonable mistake of state law). Heien
is not an exclusionary rule case, as the Court found the underlying search constitutional
despite the officer’s (reasonable) mistake. Id. Evidence also is not excluded when an officer
reasonably relies on binding appellate precedent existing at the time of the search, but which
the Supreme Court later overturns. Davis, 564 U.S. at 232, 239-40. 
47. “Under existing qualified immunity doctrine, officers do not internalize the costs of
their Fourth Amendment violations—much less the cost of their investigative steps—because
they are held liable only where the violation is obvious and the officer is ‘plainly incomp-
etent.’” Kerr, supra note 30, at 635 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
48. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971) (establishing private cause of action for violations of constitutional rights by
federal agents acting under color of law).
49. For a discussion of § 1983’s practical limitations, see Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 467-68, 476 (2004);
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort
Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 759 (2004) (observing “high doctrinal barriers” to securing
relief).
50. Law is clearly established when “existing precedent” has “placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
51. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating that qualified
immunity shields conduct that “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). For criticisms, see generally Brown, supra note 5, at 1504-06 (arguing
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less of whether the officer’s mistake is one of law, fact, or application
of law to fact.52 When the underlying legal issue is objectively open
to debate, immunity protects the officer’s offending actions from
suit,53 even when he subjectively harbors ill will.54
Officers who behave so badly that they lose qualified immunity
still enjoy the benefits of indemnification.55 Thus, the costs of § 1983
fall primarily on taxpayers.56 To add fuel to the fire, cities have af-
firmatively weakened § 1983’s feedback loop, reaching settlements
that purposely omit admissions of wrongdoing and extract confiden-
tiality agreements from victims, thereby obviating any fear of public
backlash.57
Most scholars look upon the foregoing with dismay58 and argue
either for a revamped approach to the exclusionary rule or the
Fourth Amendment itself,59 or for regulatory reforms that address
that immunity doctrines leave constitutional victims without adequate remedies); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1999)
(criticizing shortcomings in § 1983 doctrine).
52. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
53. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). 
54. As a result, Professor John Jeffries argues, courts focus unduly on existing precedent
and not the egregiousness of official behavior. Jeffries, supra note 4, at 262-64.
55. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 6, at 939-40, 942-43 (demonstrating ways in which
police are insulated from constitutional tort judgments). 
56. A city’s payouts can in fact be substantial. See, e.g., Carol A. Archbold, Risk Man-
agement in Policing, in 8 ENCYLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4494, 4495
(Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014); see also JOHN C. LIU, CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER CLAIMS REPORT FISCAL YEARS 2009 & 2010, at 1-3, 34-35, 44-51
(2011), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2011_Claims_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7Y5-JELH] (tracking millions of dollars worth of payouts in New York
City). 
57. “Unfortunately, the parties (with the puzzling cooperation of the judge and the media
when lawsuits are filed) often keep the details of tort claims hidden.” Miller & Wright, supra
note 49, at 759-60. 
58. Orin Kerr’s most recent analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, although still
critical of certain doctrines and assumptions, is notable for its use of economic and cost-benefit
analysis to explain and justify a number of the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions. See
generally Kerr, supra note 30.
59. “The Court ... has so softened the ‘probable cause’ requirement ... and so narrowed the
thrust of the exclusionary rule that nowadays the criminal only ‘goes free’ if and when the
constable has blundered badly.” Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclu-
sionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 133 (2003) (referencing Judge Cardozo’s famous
critique of the rule in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), wherein he questioned
why “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered”); see also Craig M.
Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2012) (conclud-
ing that the exclusionary rule “is not dead but has been significantly limited” by recent
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policing problems more broadly. As I explain below, a different
problem undermines the exclusionary rule’s efficacy, which is the
difficulty of detecting even the so-called flagrant violation of Fourth
Amendment rights.
B. The Less Discussed Problem: Detection
Despite its well-documented weaknesses, Fourth Amendment
doctrine does mandate relief for a specific type of violation. The
Court explicitly approves exclusion when police officers purposefully
violate Fourth Amendment rights.60 In fact, the Court views
exclusion as most valuable61 when police misconduct is “flagrant.”62
Thus, at least in theory, the flagrant and intentional Fourth
Amendment violation triggers a robust remedial response: exclusion
of useful evidence from the prosecution’s case in chief. Additionally,
if the intentional violation is so “beyond the pale” that no reasonable
officer would have committed it, the conduct also prompts tort
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,63 potential criminal liability under
18 U.S.C. § 242,64 and municipal liability, if the violation arises out
of official policy or custom.65
Supreme Court decisions).
60. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 143-44 (2009). 
61. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
62. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929, 953 (1965), cited with approval in Herring, 555 U.S. at 143. 
63. United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a violation of the
fourth amendment really is beyond the pale, the offending officers will be liable in damages.”).
64. To be prosecuted under this provision, the officer, while acting under color of law,
must act with a conscious purpose to deprive an individual of his federal or constitutional
rights. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 52, the
predecessor to § 242). On the difficulties of prosecuting a case under this provision, see I.
Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 849 (2008). 
65. Although state police departments are not “persons” under § 1983, under Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), municipalities can be sued for constitutional
violations arising out of the municipality’s policy, custom, or “deliberate indifference.” Bd. of
the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (defining “custom”); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (articulating “deliberate indifference” theory); Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-81 (1986) (explaining when an official action
constitutes “policy”). Section 1983 stops short of exposing municipalities to punitive damages,
no matter how egregious their behavior. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
271 (1981).
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It is not surprising that the Court would be most worried about
purposeful violations. Purposeful misconduct, particularly when
replicated, threatens important rule-of-law values.66 The notion of
a police force run amok undermines our collective sense of security
in our “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”67 Recognizing this
threat, the Court has approved a series of punishments for purpose-
ful violations of statutory law and the Constitution.68
But to punish a violation, one must first detect it.69 Deterrence
theory tells us that intentional misconduct is, on balance, more
difficult to detect than harms arising out of genuine mistakes or
simple negligence.70 Willful wrongdoers maintain greater incentive
and opportunity to conceal their misconduct than accidental
actors.71 The person who chooses to harm someone takes greater
pains to cover his tracks. 
Consider the characteristics commonly ascribed to policing.
Interactions between officers and citizens produce, in Professor
Scott Sundby’s words, “a multitude of ‘Fourth Amendment mo-
ments’ ranging from the routine (pulling over cars for traffic
66. Amar, supra note 25, at 809 (“Rule-of-law values ... teach us to be especially wary of
searches and seizures that allow too much arbitrariness and ad hocery, unbounded by public,
visible rules promulgated in advance by legislatures and executive agencies.”); see also Note,
Toward a General Good Faith Exception, 127 HARV. L. REV. 773, 784-85 (2013) (describing
outrageous behavior of officers that drove Supreme Court’s decisions in its “foundational”
exclusionary rule cases and concluding that purposive violations rightfully trigger more
concern than accidental violations).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment is a restraint on Executive power.”).
68. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
69. The issue I raise here—of police officers who conceal intentional violations of estab-
lished search and seizure law—differs from the government’s programmatic concealment of
technology-driven surveillance techniques. See, e.g., Luke M. Milligan, The Forgotten Right
to Be Secure, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 713, 722-27 (2014). These concerns, although concededly
substantial, are beyond the scope of this proposal.
70. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1223 (1985) (“[O]ne who plans a murder in advance will also take steps to escape detection
afterward.”); see also Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 706 (1997) (describing
intentional wrongdoing as “uniquely difficult to detect because it is deliberately hidden”).
71. See Posner, supra note 70, at 1203 (comparing accidents with intentional behavior).
See generally Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J.
ECONOMICS 341 (1990) (earliest formal account of avoidance); Jacob Nussim & Avraham D.
Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314 (2009) (modeling costs of
avoidance); Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006)
(describing the avoidance phenomenon).
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violations) to the unexpected (spotting suspicious behavior while
walking a beat).”72 These so-called moments—taking place quickly
in thoroughfares with citizens passing by—can occur fully or partial-
ly outside the public’s view.73 Such circumstances remain difficult
to analyze with certainty, even with the aid of audio or video record-
ings.74 
Empirical evidence validates these concerns. Scholars who have
interviewed and surveyed police departments have long reported
incomplete and sometimes weak adherence to Fourth Amendment
rules.75 Even the most serious violators can hide in plain sight. A
well-regarded observational study of a medium-size police depart-
ment in the Midwest (Middleberg) concluded that at least 30 percent
of the suspects searched during a three-month period were unjustifi-
ably searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment.76
72. Scott E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero: The Suppression Hearing as Morality
Play, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 255, 259 (2010). 
73. Livingston, supra note 32, at 656 (citing difficulties that inhere in resolving complaints
that “involve one-on-one confrontations between an officer and a citizen”); Greg Pogarsky &
Alex R. Piquero, Studying the Reach of Deterrence: Can Deterrence Theory Help Explain Police
Misconduct?, 32 J. CRIM. JUST. 371, 371-372 (2004) (observing that police officers exercise
“broad discretion under little direct supervision”). 
74. On the usage of body cameras to resolve competing narratives, see WHITE, supra note
12, at 23-24. For an account of the ways in which one’s cultural viewpoint affects one’s
interpretation of videotaped events, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841
(2009) (reporting results of a study in which survey participants were asked questions
regarding a police chase of a suspect). 
75. Perrin et al., supra note 25, at 795-99 (citing evidence from a survey measuring police
officers’ attitudes toward the exclusionary rule). Scholars often invoke the historical surge in
“dropsy” cases—cases in which the arresting officer contended that the contraband was
conveniently dropped or abandoned—in the years following the Supreme Court’s adoption of
the exclusionary rule for state officers. See Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2175, 2203-04 (2015) (summarizing Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION,
May 8, 1967, at 596-97); see also Capers, supra note 64, at 868-70 (citing earlier and
additional sources); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or
Replace—The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 160 n.53
(2009) (citing the Mollen Commission’s 1994 report on corruption within the NYPD, which
included perjury regarding search and seizure cases). For skepticism regarding the
pervasiveness of testilying and similar “Fourth Amendment fraud,” see Kevin R. Reitz,
Testilying as a Problem of Crime Control: A Reply to Professor Slobogin, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
1061, 1062-64 (1996) (questioning inferences from limited studies). Reitz’s discussion predates
Gould and Mastrofski’s study discussed in the text and infra notes 76-81.
76. Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 331 (2004) (“Thirty percent
of the 115 suspects in our sample were searched unconstitutionally.”). From this sample and
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The bulk of Middleberg’s violations were concentrated among just
a few officers, none of whom “appeared to be angry, cynical, or the
composite of a disillusioned officer with an axe to grind.”77 Instead,
“all were well regarded by their peers and supervisors and ex-
pressed a desire to establish strong bonds with neighborhood resi-
dents.”78 This desire to bond with residents was not just cheap talk:
the officer responsible for the most illegal searches was also one of
the most “low-key officers” that the researchers observed, and
“frequently made small jokes with the suspects he searched, made
small talk, and was always very polite.”79
The Middleberg study underscores the difficulty in detecting
Fourth Amendment violations, even by a police force’s internal
investigations unit. The red flags we commonly associate with police
misconduct—lack of respect, anger, and low morale—had little
correlation with the violations observed in Middleberg.80 Instead,
the “low-key” officer who was chatty and polite with his targets
instigated the largest number of violations.81
The study also suggests the limitations of social media and
technology in monitoring and recording police movements.82 No
doubt, Facebook and other Internet-related tools can quickly and
efficiently alert officials to dangerous instances of brutality, as can
dashboard and body cameras.83 The Department of Justice enthusi-
astically endorsed these devices in 2015, and their popularity is
Middleberg’s typical staffing levels, the authors estimate 12,000-14,000 unconstitutional
searches occur per year. Id. For an extended discussion of the researchers’ methodology, see
id. at 324-30. 
77. Id. at 345. Seven officers were responsible for 70 percent of the illegal searches. Id. at
344.
78. Id. at 345.
79. Id. Even if several of these violations were, by themselves, “negligent” and not pur-
poseful, as a whole even the Court would likely characterize them as “recurrent negligence.”
Cf. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (observing that “there is no indication that
this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct”). 
80. Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 76, at 345.
81. Id.
82. On the emergence of these tools, see Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 391, 393 (2016).
83. The recording of the officer who shot and killed an unarmed man in North Carolina
aided in his subsequent arrest and termination. See Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, Seeing
Path to Justice in Video of Shooting on Bystander’s Phone, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/us/cellphone-video-of-michael-slager-shooting-walter-scott-is-
seen-as-a-path-to-justice.html [https://perma.cc/GKQ4-VMFP].
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bound to increase as they become cheaper and more powerful.84 It
is important to note their limitations, however. There still exists a
wide gulf between police brutality and the ambiguous conduct that
often masks an unconstitutional search or seizure.85 Cameras may
be adept in documenting the former, but it is far from clear how well
they can identify the latter.86 
More importantly, most cities lack the ability to record every
interaction between officers and citizens, much less review all of
those interactions for evidence of wrongdoing.87 In addition, cameras
may not capture everything police see and perceive.88 For that rea-
son, police officers might reasonably argue that a recorded depiction
of a search falls short of depicting the “full picture” that led an
officer to cross the threshold of either reasonable suspicion or prob-
able cause.89
Notwithstanding the foregoing, recording devices are valuable in
regard to the pricing proposal described in this Article. Despite their
limitations, body and dashboard cameras can aid regulators in
determining and verifying search volume. With the aid of sampling
techniques, recording devices can aid regulators in determining
whether a police department’s self-reported frisks, automobile
searches, and so-forth reflect some version of reality or represent
pure fabrications. For a pricing regime premised in part on self-
reported police data, this contribution is immeasurable.90
84. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Awards over $23 Million in
Funding for Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in 32
States (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-
million-funding-body-worn-camera-pilot-program-support-law [https://perma.cc/K4AL-PAM2].
85. On the drawbacks of body and dashboard cameras, see Howard M. Wasserman,
Commentary, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 840 (2015); Sarah
Lustbader, The Real Problem with Police Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/12/02/opinion/the-real-problem-with-police-video.html [https://perma.cc/
8Q8R-EG5H].
86. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 12, at 20-22.
87. See, e.g., id. at 33-34.
88. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1813 (2015).
89. By contrast, even the grainiest of recordings will document an officer’s beating or
gratuitous shooting of an unarmed suspect.
90. On the enforcement and data-related challenges of implementing a corrective tax
regime for Fourth Amendment violations, see infra Part IV.B.
1120 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1103
C. Detection’s Implications
The preceding Section explained why intentional Fourth Amend-
ment violations are difficult to detect. Low detection rates reduce
the probability of punishment, which in turn impairs deterrence.91
Under the standard model set forth by Gary Becker, individuals
are deterred from wrongdoing when the costs of wrongdoing out-
weigh the benefits.92 Costs comprise the probability of punishment
multiplied by the expected sanction.93 Although one might reason-
ably equate these two variables (or perhaps prefer extremely high
monetary sanctions),94 contemporary deterrence theorists now
recognize the necessity for less than maximal sanctions.95
91. Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of
Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1443, 1448 (“The
deterrence of wrongful police conduct would likely be underproduced if ... a significant amount
of wrongful behavior went undetected or if that substantial underdetection were not remedied
by penalties that substantially exceeded the officer’s gain.”).
92. Becker is traditionally cited as the first economist to formally model the criminal’s net
expected benefits and costs. See Posner, supra note 25, at 54 n.17 (crediting Becker with the
“classic modern statement” of the economic model of deterrence). Under Becker’s model, a
criminal’s expected costs are the product of the sanction prescribed by law and the probability
of detection and punishment. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-78 (1968). The rational criminal abandons a crime when the
activity’s net expected costs exceed their benefits. Id. at 177. Thus, a regulator should set the
sanction to equal the social harm divided by the probability of punishment. For an illustration
of Becker’s formula, see Posner, supra note 25, at 54 n.17 (“[I]f the probability of
apprehending some offender were .1, and the cost of the offense $1,000, the optimum fine
would be $10,000. Since the chance of its being imposed would be only one in ten, the
prospective offender would face an expected punishment cost of $1,000, just equal to the cost
of the offense to the victim.”). Becker’s model draws on Beccaria and Bentham. Becker, supra,
at 209; see also CESARE MARCHESE DI BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 19-21 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Brian Davis et al. trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1995) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 200-01 (Richard Hildreth
trans., N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. 1975) (1802).
93. Becker’s model analyzes criminal misconduct but can be applied with some
modifications to the study of intentional police misconduct. For literature analogizing police
misconduct to criminal behavior, see Armacost, supra note 49, at 464-65; and Rushin, supra
note 14, at 1355.
94. Economists presume that fines, as distinct from imprisonment, impose no social cost
but simply transfer wealth from one person (the wrongdoer) to the state. See, e.g., STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 509 (2004) (explaining baseline
preference for fines over imprisonment). 
95. The probability of punishment is “the product of a series of [several] conditional
probabilities,” which include the probability of apprehension (often expressed as the
probability of “detection”), the likelihood of being charged and convicted, and the likelihood
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Low-probability, high-sanction regimes suffer several well-docu-
mented drawbacks.96 First, when the sanction is a fine, individuals
lacking the means to pay are underdeterred.97 Second, high-sanction
schemes undermine “marginal” deterrence, the phenomenon
whereby criminals choose less harmful conduct because it carries a
lesser sanction.98 To posit an extreme example, if the law punished
all Fourth Amendment violations with capital punishment, police
officers would be perversely incentivized to kill their victims.99
Third, high-sanction, low-probability schemes generate more errors
among offenders, particularly when probability of detection is
unknown or uncertain.100 And finally, high-sanction schemes falter
because they increase the likelihood of delay—an offender will fight
an extremely high sanction in court rather than accede to it—and
because individuals experience less disutility from penalties slated
to occur in the future.101
Given the foregoing, it should come as no surprise that criminolo-
gists routinely observe that a slight increase in the probability of
of receiving certain penalties. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and
Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 75 (2015). Studies demonstrate the strongest correlation between
the probability of apprehension and deterrence. See id. (citing Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in
the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 199 (2013)) (concluding that detection is the
most reliable deterrent). 
96. Were these drawbacks not present, one would almost always choose the high-sanction
scheme because it requires little investment in enforcement. This is particularly the case
where the sanction is nonmonetary (for example, imprisonment) and requires a substantial
investment by the state. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 92, at 207 (discussing fines).
97. “If the assets of parties are low relative to the magnitude of the sanction necessary to
deter, then deterrence will tend to be insufficient if only monetary sanctions are employed.”
SHAVELL, supra note 94, at 510. Many of these points are discussed extensively in A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 403, 412 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
98. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970) (widely credited with coining the “marginal deterrence” concept and term).
99. For further discussion of this concept, as well as its interaction with total deterrence,
see Posner, supra note 70, at 1207-08. 
100. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions when Individuals Are
Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 369
(1992).
101. On time lags and their effects on sanctions, see Yair Listokin, Essay, Crime and (with
a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 115, 116 (2007). For more on discounts, myopia, and the manner by which prisoners
adjust to imprisonment (thereby lessening the sanction’s effect), see A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of
Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-6, 10-11 (1999).
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detection creates a far greater deterrent effect than a corresponding
increase in the sanction.102 If the state wishes to deter police
misconduct, it needs to worry about detection, and as we have
already seen, a decent number of intentional search and seizure
violations are likely to go undetected.103
An additional complication is the fact that Fourth Amendment
violations occur within police departments.104 Depending on how
laws are designed, organizations can either hamper or improve
deterrence. On one hand, organizations can promote wrongdoing
with their policies and shield individuals from punishment through
various procedures.105 Alternatively, when properly incentivized,
organizations can aid in educating and monitoring their members
and disciplining the few residual rogues.106
If there exist liability rules that incentivize police forces to
optimally police themselves, society has yet to identify them. A
number of scholars have argued for improving law enforcement’s
internal compliance efforts,107 and recent scholarship suggests some
positive movement in this direction.108 Many police forces already
screen candidates, conduct training sessions, and employ mecha-
nisms designed to monitor and discipline bad behavior.109 But these
102. For a helpful overview of perceptual deterrence literature, see Daniel S. Nagin,
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1,
5-7, 12, 15, 19 (1998). For analysis (and criticism) of the earlier studies linking certainty with
deterrence, see Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 179-81 (1987)
(arguing that earlier survey responses may reflect offenders’ realization, upon being punished,
that certainty of punishment was high).
103. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 49, at 464-65.
105. “Wrongdoing within firms has two chief distinguishing characteristics for the legal
system: firms causally affect the incidence of wrongdoing ex ante, and they contribute to or
detract from the effectiveness of detection and sanctioning ex post.” Samuel W. Buell,
Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1623 (2007) (encapsulating
enforcement challenges that inhere in punishing wrongdoing that arises within for-profit
corporations).
106. See id. at 1625.
107. See supra notes 12-13.
108. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2-3, 5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733783 [https://perma.
cc/KVR3-8E35].
109. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform,
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 35 (2012) (citing training and monitoring programs). Police
forces can also obtain third party accreditation for their internal training and disciplinary
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activities are a far cry from actively sussing out suspicionless frisks
and disciplining officers for fabricated traffic violations.110 
To properly observe Fourth Amendment-related misconduct, a
city would need to direct significant resources towards covert stings
and unannounced audits of search and seizure activity.111 Not only
would these efforts cost money, but they would potentially increase
the jurisdiction’s acquittal rate, assuming city authorities disclosed
their findings publicly. Moreover, they would likely draw backlash
from, among others, citizens and police unions.112 None of this is to
deny the growth of department-level compliance efforts. But given
the well-documented upfront costs associated with implementing
strong internal controls, we should not be surprised if police
departments allocate relatively modest resources to the oversight of
Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.113 
Finally, Fourth Amendment remedial law falters on account of its
lack of “sanction multipliers.”114 Ordinarily, a legal regime can
partially offset low detection rates by increasing the sanction vari-
processes. The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies provides accred-
itation and training services for law enforcement organizations. See The Commission, CALEA,
http://www.calea.org/content/commission [https://perma.cc/2HSZ-YG4Z]. For discussion and
criticism of accreditation, see William M. Doerner & William G. Doerner, Police Accreditation
and Clearance Rates, 35 POLICING 6, 18 (2012) (finding no correlation between accreditation
and rate at which policing organizations solve crimes); Kimberly A. McCabe & Robin G.
Fajardo, Law Enforcement Accreditation: A National Comparison of Accredited vs. Nonac-
credited Agencies, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 127, 130 (2001) (finding relatively few differences). 
110. On the factors that undermine internal discipline and compliance, see Eric J. Miller,
Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 547 (2015) (describing “strident opposition”
unions have raised in response to citizen review boards); Kami Chavis Simmons, New
Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police
Reform, 59 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 373, 390 n.101 (2010) (discussing cultural norms); Seth W.
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2212 (2014) (“Even
when discipline is imposed, the grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements can
frustrate or undermine the disciplinary measures.”). Police-friendly laws further weaken the
state’s ability to discipline and reform internal police units. Harmon, supra note 15, at 799-
800.
111. See Armacost, supra note 49, at 497-98; Simmons, supra note 110, at 389.
112. See Stoughton, supra note 110, at 2216.
113. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (describing “cosmetic compliance”
programs initiated by corporations that only superficially monitor and discipline employees
for violations of law). 
114. On the utility and application of multipliers generally, see Richard Craswell,
Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH L. REV. 2185
(1999). 
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able.115 So, for example, a court or legislature might impose a $1000
sanction for a particular wrong whose harm is valued at $100 and
whose probability of detection is just 10 percent.116 Multipliers such
as these, however, have no application in the Fourth Amendment
context. 
Consider the inherent difficulty in applying a multiplier to a
sanction such as exclusion. There exists no principled method by
which courts can exclude more evidence than was tainted by an
officer’s violation.117 Unlike money, which can be reduced or inflated
with remarkable precision, in-kind sanctions such as the exclusion-
ary rule are binary and rigid.118 Exclusion does not permit calibra-
tion or manipulation, and its “value” is difficult to judge from case
to case.119 
Multipliers are similarly unavailable in the § 1983 context, albeit
for different reasons. Individual officer defendants are likely judg-
ment proof, and municipalities enjoy the protections afforded by
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., in which the Supreme Court
held that § 1983 stopped short of authorizing punitive damages
against a municipality no matter how outrageous its conduct.120
In sum, the tools available to either cure or offset low detection
rates are unavailable in the Fourth Amendment context. If the only
available remedy is an ex post remedy premised on detection, it is
sure to fail.
II. THE TURN TO PRICING
As Part I argues, the Fourth Amendment suffers from a detection
problem, and low probabilities of detection suppress deterrence. “[I]f
ex post remedies fail,” Professors Bar-Gill and Friedman tell us, “the
115. Professors Polinsky and Shavell have articulated this model for torts: for the “injurer
[who] has a chance of escaping liability” the proper sanction “is the harm caused multiplied
by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable.” A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998). 
116. Cf. Posner, supra note 25, at 54 n.17.
117. The exclusionary rule “can do no more than deprive a government of the value of the
excluded evidence.” Harmon, supra note 109, at 40.
118. See id.
119. See Re, supra note 10, at 1894-902. 
120. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
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law turns to ex ante alternatives.”121 For many Fourth Amendment
scholars, this invariably translates into a prescription for a more
robust warrant requirement122 or greater administrative constraints
on search and seizure policies.123
Part II explores a different regulatory approach, known as
corrective or Pigouvian taxation. Scholars have long debated
whether Pigouvian price instruments can reduce externalities and
improve social welfare.124 Corrective tax regimes are popular with
economists but rare in practice.125 This may either be attributable
to political factors, as Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner
contend,126 or due to inherent design flaws. For the sake of clarity,
the discussion below first catalogues the corrective tax scheme’s
theoretical advantages and drawbacks, before considering the
scheme’s suitability in the Fourth Amendment context.
A. Taxation’s Advantages 
Law and economics scholars have long recognized the differences
between ex post regimes that punish and those that merely price
socially undesirable behavior.127 Pricing regimes tell regulated
actors to pay for the social harms their activity causes, whereas
121. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1613; see also Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante
Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1719-21 (2015) (analyzing advantages and drawbacks of
ex ante regulation compared to ex post tort liability). 
122. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1613-14. For a recent law-and-economics
critique of the presumption that warrants impose costs on law enforcement officers, see Tonja
Jacobi & Jonah Kind, Criminal Innovation and the Warrant Requirement: Reconsidering the
Rights-Police Efficiency Trade-Off, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 791-807 (2015). 
123. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 196 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 95-97 (2016).
124. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Towards a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 93, 100-04 (2015).
125. “It would be an understatement to say that economists endorse Pigouvian taxes over
command-and-control regulation.” Id. at 96.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194-200 (1991);
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-25 (1984) (explaining that
“[a] sanction is a detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden” whereas “a price is payment
of money which is required in order to do what is permitted” (emphasis omitted)). Concededly,
the demarcation between price and sanction is not always so clear. See, e.g., John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 925-27, 930 (2010)
(exploring tort law’s moral content). 
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punishments announce which behavior is forbidden and morally
wrongful.128 Modern regulation sometimes mixes the two modalities,
sometimes to its detriment.129 
A government authority can impose prices before or after any
harm has occurred.130 Prices in turn may be purely monetary, or
imposed in-kind through nonmonetary requirements such as filling
out extensive paperwork associated with complicated licenses.131 
The tax strategy is often referred to as a corrective or Pigouvian
tax, in honor of Arthur C. Pigou, a British economist who first
described the need for taxes and subsidies to alter the behavior of
producers whose “private” costs paled in comparison to their activ-
ities’ “social” costs.132 Pigou’s work is frequently cited as the pro-
genitor of externality-driven regulation.133 When a producer imposes
externalities on third parties through his activity, a government
entity can respond by placing direct constraints on that activity (so-
called command-and-control regulation), demanding that the
producer take certain precautions prior to or contemporaneous with
that activity (a fault-based rule), or impose taxes on the producer
that reflect the expected harm generated by such activity.134
128. Cooter, supra note 127, at 1524-25.
129. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms,
and the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1136-39 (2014). Sharon Davies has concluded that the
exclusionary rule bears characteristics of pricing and punishment and suffers as a result. See
Davies, supra note 39, at 1279, 1336-37. 
130. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 121, at 1718 (explaining that payment of a tax occurs “while
the conduct is happening” whereas the payment of a tort award occurs “long after”). 
131. See Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax
on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (2013). For a discussion of the ways in which certain
federal agencies quantify paperwork burdens (often in aggregate amounts), see Adam M.
Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279, 280 (2015).
132. PIGOU, supra note 19, at 192.
133. Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
135, 142 (2014) (“Many trace the concept of externalities to the economist Arthur Pigou.”).
Pigou’s argument for regulation was partially rebutted by Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16, 40 (1960) (setting forth the theorem that the initial
allocation of rights may not matter when transaction costs are low enough that parties can
strike a bargain for property’s most efficient use). For a contemporary comparison, see David
B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 394-95 (2014)
(comparing Pigouvian and Coasian approaches to problems such as fracking).
134. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 128-29 (1992) (separating regulation into three
forms: command-and-control; standards-based; and incentive-based). For more recent
applications, see Brian Galle, Tax, Command ... or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation,
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The corrective tax improves social welfare by forcing regulated
actors to internalize harms they impose on third parties. Its
advantages over other forms of regulation (most notably command-
and-control) include information, timing, and detection.
1. Information
The traditional argument advanced in favor of the Pigouvian tax
is that it requires less information of the regulator than command-
and-control regulation.135 If a regulator desires to cap quantities of
a certain product or demand precautions at efficient levels, she has
to estimate both the costs and benefits of the underlying activity, as
well as the expected costs and benefits of any mandated precau-
tion.136 When the regulator measures or misestimates any of these
variables, the resulting activity level is inefficient (too much or too
little).137 By the same token, when precaution costs vary signifi-
cantly among producers, the rule will produce inefficient results
among producers, since it may overcharge some and undercharge
others.138 
In contrast, the Pigouvian tax requires the regulator to divine
solely the activity’s social costs.139 Once the tax is assessed, private
actors can then decide for themselves how much activity to under-
take and whether to adopt certain precautions. So long as the tax
internalizes the “social costs” these actors impose on others, they
92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 843-53 (2014) (mapping options across several dimensions).
135. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18, at 1-2; Masur & Posner, supra note 124,
at 95; Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 97, at 139, 176. Several scholars dispute this claim. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Prices
vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 478-80 (1974) (arguing that iterative regulatory
process erodes the tax regime’s informational advantage); John V.C. Nye, The Pigou Problem,
REG., Summer 2008, at 32, 32 (contending that taxes that measure externalities but fail to
consider “all regulations and [private] transfers affecting equilibrium” will fail to produce
optimal results); Jacob Nussim, Information Costs of Externality Control Instruments 2, 7-8
(Dec. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2395152 [https://
perma.cc/42X2-3WSY] (contending that information differences disappear once the regulator
takes into account the possibility of the victim’s ability to mitigate harm).
136. Masur & Posner, supra note 124, at 95.
137. See id.
138. See Galle, supra note 121, at 1725-27.
139. Masur & Posner, supra note 124, at 95.
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presumably will make efficient decisions and improve welfare.140
Accordingly, as Steven Shavell has observed, the Pigouvian tax
behaves largely like an ex ante version of strict liability.141
2. Timing
Traditional liability schemes impose costs on regulated actors not
only after the occurrence of some harm, but also after it has been
identified and proven.142 Accordingly, a significant period of time
extends between the moment an actor engages in harmful activity
and the moment he pays for it.143
Delay is problematic for several reasons. It reduces the probabil-
ity of punishment, as witnesses’ memories recede and documents
disappear.144 Second, because payment is slated for the future,
managers can conclude (quite rationally) that their firms will be
judgment proof in future periods or that they themselves will no
longer work for the firm when bills ultimately come due.145 Finally,
delay exacerbates the well-known tendency to overemphasize near-
term costs and benefits.146 If an individual is particularly myopic,
even a modest enforcement delay is likely to play an important role
in undermining near-term compliance with legal rules and stan-
dards.147 
Pigouvian taxation alleviates these problems. Because the tax
arises contemporaneously with an activity and not at some distant
point in the future, it compels an earlier payment, thereby averting
140. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18, at 2 (“[Corrective taxes] harness firms’ information
about control costs, making possible a result in which the level of externality is optimal (or
more nearly so).”). 
141. Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule
over Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 300 (2013) (declaring the Pigouvian tax the “ex ante
cousin” of strict liability).
142. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 121, at 1718.
143. See id.
144. Cf. Shavell, supra note 141, at 297-98 (conceding ex ante regulation’s advantages
when there exist difficulties in proving causation). 
145. See Galle, supra note 121, at 1743-48 (addressing liquidity problems and issues caused
by managerial agency costs). 
146. See id. at 1734-38 (describing this myopia and similar problems).
147. For a discussion of this problem in the corporate context, see Miriam H. Baer,
Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FLA. L. REV. 87, 104-06 (2014). 
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the cognitive biases described above.148 Earlier timing also preserves
accountability: the manager who predicts she will be working
somewhere else in Periods 2 or 3 when tort liability finally sinks in,
knows that she will still be working at the firm in Period 1, when
the regulator assesses a tax.149 As a result, she takes greater care
either to avoid the tax or to price it into her firm’s activities, thereby
reducing intertemporal agency costs.150 
Finally, because the tax applies at an earlier period and reflects
only the probability that harm will occur (which presumably is far
less than certain), it exacts a less onerous fee than the compensa-
tory judgment eventually recovered under a tort regime.151 As a
result, the firm that might have been effectively judgment proof to
a much larger tort judgment is able to pay a more modest annual
tax.152 Relatedly, the conversion of a large and contingent tort
judgment into a more modest and certain annual fee may also
reduce costs associated with risk aversion.153 To that end, the tax
functions very much like an insurance premium.154 Boundedly
148. Galle, supra note 121, at 1759.
149. See Baer, supra note 147, at 117.
150. Agency costs arise when an agent fails to adhere to the wishes of her principal, on
whose behalf she has promised to act. Id. at 118-19. Intertemporal agency costs arise when
the costs and benefits of an agent’s behavior fall in different periods, allowing her to avoid the
feedback loop that might otherwise exist once the principal became aware of the agent’s bad
behavior. Id. at 117-20. 
151. Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 273 &
n.3 (2011) (agreeing that the judgment proof problem “is less serious for taxation than for
liability”).
152. See id.
153. To the extent individuals respond more rationally to small, certain payments than
they do to large, contingent ones, the former is preferable. See Ehud Kamar, Shareholder
Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 890 (1999) (ascribing
the difference between a low and certain fine and a high and uncertain fine as a “deadweight
loss to society” when actors are risk averse).
154. See Galle, supra note 121, at 1739 (explaining that “compulsory insurance ...
transforms ex post liability into ex ante costs”).
There are, it should be pointed out, significant differences between a tax and an insurance
premium. The tax is set by a public regulator and reflects risk of harm, whereas the insurance
premium is set by the insurance market and reflects, among other things, the risk that an
insurer will be forced to pay for the costs associated with a lawsuit. For more on insurance
and policing, see generally Rappaport, supra note 108. For a rigorous description of the
activities liability insurance underwiters undertake in order to manage and reduce risk
among their insureds, see Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1412, 1418 (2013) (describing
“five main tools that almost all insurers use to one degree or another” to control risk).
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rational actors who would otherwise ignore or delay a response to a
very large but contingent tort judgment respond more readily to a
smaller and more predictable annual tax.
3. Detection
Liability regimes for difficult-to-detect behavior either must rely
upon high sanctions to offset low detection rates (with all of its
trade-offs), or otherwise invest in expensive enforcement efforts.155
If both of these strategies are unavailable, an ex post liability
scheme loses its credibility and actors defy the rules they find
costly.156 
Corrective taxes sidestep the detection problem. When activity (as
opposed to harm) can be relatively easily observed and attributed to
a given producer, an activity-based tax will be preferable to an ex
post liability scheme.157 
In sum, the corrective tax presents a number of theoretical
regulatory benefits. It requires less information than command-
and-control regulation, avoids the delay associated with certain
types of litigation, and overcomes low detection rates. With all these
advantages to its name, one might indeed agree with Professors
Masur and Posner that it is underused. Then again, one must first
grapple with its drawbacks.
B. Taxation’s Disadvantages
Pigouvian schemes are not always optimal. In fact, according to
some scholars, only the rare confluence of circumstances renders
them viable, which is why they are so rare. Their most noted
disadvantages include politics, variance, and enforcement.
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. Some people may comply because of social norms or their belief in the legitimacy of
the underlying system that produced the rules. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITH-
OUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167-68, 174-76 (1991); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26-27 (2006).
157. See Victor Fleischer, Essay, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1673, 1691 (2015) (“Tax instruments are easiest to use to achieve social policy goals
when policymakers can readily observe the relationship between the activity causing the
harm and the amount of harm caused.”).
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1. Politics
All regulatory schemes attract political opponents, but Pigouvian
schemes tend to draw sustained fire from both sides of the political
aisle.158 Professors Masur and Posner speculate that the Pigouvian
approach loses politicians on the right because it is perceived as a
government tax,159 and repels those on the left because it conveys
the message that regulated entities can do whatever they wish so
long as they pay the requisite fee.160 As a result, the Pigouvian
scheme rarely attracts the support sufficient to ensure its enact-
ment, implementation, or enforcement.
2. Variance
According to Professor Fleischer, the Pigouvian scheme’s greatest
challenge is variance.161 Indeed, as Fleischer tells it, variance—and
not political or administrative resistance—explains the scheme’s
scarcity.162
A tax that optimally internalizes harm requires regulators to
estimate an activity’s average social cost and then charge actors a
fee for each marginal unit of activity or production.163 If a unit of
carbon causes $100 worth of harm, each producer will be charged
$100, multiplied by the number of units produced. Producers will
presumably then incorporate social costs into their decision whether
to produce more carbon, thereby improving social welfare.164
As Fleischer observes, the Pigouvian calculation is quite feasible
when each unit triggers the same amount of harm regardless of the
producer in question.165 Many activities, however, fail to follow the
carbon example. According to Fleischer, variance poses an even
158. See Masur & Posner, supra note 124, at 98-99.
159. Id. at 99. 
160. Id.
161. “The problem is that when marginal social cost varies, average cost does not equal
marginal cost, and Pigovian taxes may not lead to an optimal allocation of economic
resources.” Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1676-77.
162. See id. at 1676-78.
163. See id. at 1675, 1679.
164. See id. at 1702-03.
165. See id. at 1691-92; see also Galle, supra note 121, at 1729 (observing that “the damage
done by a ton of carbon is roughly the same whoever emits it”).
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greater problem when a small number of producers are responsible
for causing the most damage; for these bad actors, the scheme is
almost certain to underprice.166 
Regulators can overcome the variance problem by placing actors
into relevant risk categories and assigning different fees to each
category.167 Fleischer approvingly cites congestion pricing as an
example of such an approach.168 Since trucks cause more pollution
than cars, the regulator can assess the truck driver a higher fee
than the automobile driver.169 Beyond this example, scholars dis-
agree on how well this categorization strategy can revive Pigouvian
tax schemes. Whereas Fleischer expresses skepticism, Professor
Brian Galle argues that the creation of just a few categories can
reduce variance to workable levels.170 Galle and Fleischer concur,
however, that for the categories to work they must reflect character-
istics that are relevant and easy to observe.171 They also agree that
the creation and designation of firms into different categories
increases the Pigouvian scheme’s administrative and design costs.172
3. Enforcement
A final drawback for Pigouvian schemes (and all ex ante regula-
tion) is enforcement. Aside from designing the scheme, the regulator
must expend resources collecting and enforcing the assessed tax.173
Although enforcement may be fairly simple in some circumstances,
166. Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680 (“[W]here a few bad actors cause most of the harm,
a uniform excise tax set at the rate of average social cost per individual is not likely to be
effective. It will under-deter the bad actors, and over-deter those who cause little or no harm.”
(footnote omitted)).
167. See id.
168. See id. 
169. See id. But see Galle, supra note 121, at 1729.
170. Compare Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680 (citing difficulties in sorting actors into
workable categories), with Galle, supra note 121, at 1734 (suggesting greater reason for
optimism that regulators can craft just a few workable categories).
171. See Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680; Galle, supra note 121, at 1734.
172. See Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680 (conceding that categorization “improves the
effectiveness of the tax instrument but ... creates greater administrative costs in designing,
administering and enforcing the tax”); Galle, supra note 121, at 1734.
173. See Shavell, supra note 141, at 277 (“Under the negligence rule ... the cost of eval-
uating compliance is experienced only with the probability that harm occurs. Consequently,
the negligence rule clearly involves lower expected enforcement costs than regulation.”).
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it can grow costly in others, particularly when the taxable activity
is itself difficult to verify or observe. Accordingly, the scheme’s
collection and enforcement-related costs may render it more
expensive than an ex post tort liability regime, whose enforcement
costs arise only after an actual harm occurs and is detected.174 
C. A Pigouvian Fourth Amendment?
From the preceding discussion, we can take stock of the Pigouvian
scheme’s advantages and disadvantages. The scheme requires less
information than certain types of regulation175 and circumvents the
detection issues that plague litigation-based remedies.176 It acceler-
ates the actor’s payment of money for certain behavior, thereby
mitigating cognitive bias and reversing the actor’s rational calcula-
tion that he will either be judgment proof or somewhere else when
costs finally hit.177 On the other hand, the scheme can be difficult to
design and costly to enforce.178 It is prone to error and sends coun-
terproductive messages.179 When it is framed as a “tax,” it becomes
politically unpopular,180 and (presumably) when administered by the
federal government, it inspires distrust among at least some
percentage of the public. 
How do these advantages and drawbacks play out in the Fourth
Amendment context? The Fourth Amendment provides an interest-
ing, if somewhat unusual, opportunity to debate corrective taxation.
To begin with, scholars already widely regard the Fourth Amend-
ment’s ex post liability options as insufficient.181 Accordingly, some
regulatory alternative is necessary.182 
174. Id. at 275-76. Nevertheless, Shavell concedes that, in some instances, liability schemes
fail to fully capture harmful activity, thereby necessitating ex ante regulation. Id. at 298-99.
175. See supra Part II.A.1.
176. See supra Part II.A.3.
177. See supra Part II.A.2.
178. See supra Part II.B.3.
179. See supra Part II.B.2.
180. See supra Part II.B.1.
181. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1613; see also supra Part I.A.
182. Cf. Huq, supra note 19, at 249-50 (comparing ex post and ex ante rules as a means of
constraining law enforcement officers); Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for Harm
vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888, 889
(1990) (contending that ex post and ex ante approaches can complement each other). 
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There are, of course, many types of regulation, so we should
inquire how the corrective tax (or “fee”) fares in relation to other
types of regulation, such as direct constraints on police officers and
their departments. The emerging “democratic policing” literature
favors a world in which citizens, either directly or through the
application of an administrative law framework, constrain police
discretion and power.183 How does the tax perform in comparison to
these local variations of command-and-control regulation?
Consider the case of warrants. A number of scholars have argued
for the expansion of the warrant requirement.184 Not only is this
expansion obligated by the Fourth Amendment’s text,185 they say,
but it is also the innovation best poised to improve police
behavior.186 Because a warrant is costly187—that is, it requires time
and effort for a police officer to acquire it—it reduces the likelihood
that police will undertake frivolous or patently illegal searches.188
Accordingly, proponents say, a warrant rule that drastically
forecloses the number and variety of warrantless searches also
improves police efficiency.189 The police conduct fewer searches, but
the searches that remain are more often successful.190 Thus, the
argument for a beefed-up warrant requirement can be viewed as an
effort to replace a faltering ex post sanction (the exclusionary rule)
with a putatively more efficient ex ante obligation. 
The Pigouvian tax literature illuminates several weaknesses in
this “warrants are better” argument.191 To the extent an extremely
183. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827, 1834 (2015). Other scholars have imagined ways to improve public voice in
policing. See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 82, at 394-95.
184. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1616-17; Gray, supra note 11, at 433.
185. See Gray, supra note 11, at 433.
186. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1636 (“[A] warrant requirement would improve
the quality of police decisonmaking.”). 
187. Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 926
(2009) (“Searches pursuant to a warrant are more expensive for law enforcement than those
without warrants.”).
188. See id. at 927. 
189. See id. at 927-28.
190. See id.
191. In their recent article, Tonja Jacobi and Jonah Kind also demonstrate the problems
underlying the assumption that warrants uniformly impose costs on police officers. See Jacobi
& Kind, supra note 122, at 767-68. Although warrantless searches are often cheaper, “because
criminals can innovate, the assumption of greater law-enforcement efficiency” for warrantless
searches does not always hold true. Id. at 767.
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strong warrant requirement severely reduces the number of
warrantless searches, it shares the same problems as more tradi-
tional forms of command-and-control regulation. That is, for a
regulator to eliminate or reduce the number and category of
warrantless searches in a manner that improves social welfare, the
regulator must know not only their marginal costs, but also their
marginal benefits.192 Moreover, within a given state or large city, an
idealized regulator must perform this feat for multiple police
departments, whose cost-benefit equations may well differ.193 
The same analysis arises with regard to policing precautions.
When the legislature adopts, in the name of improved efficiency, a
law or series of laws demanding precautionary measures, its
judgment reflects a determination not just of marginal costs, but
also of marginal benefits.194 Getting the measurement right for just
one police department is difficult. Performing the same feat for
many departments at the same time is nearly impossible, as each
department maintains a unique equilibrium point.195 
Corrective taxes, by contrast, require the regulator to deal only
with the cost side of the equation.196 The Pigouvian regulator need
not consider benefits of a certain type of warrantless search; rather,
she need only consider its violation-related risks and costs. The
point is not to say there is no benefit to be gained from such activity.
Rather, the tax regime presumes that the individual actor—or in
this case, individual police department—can best determine what
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. The judiciary—the institution most likely to be tasked with setting the contours of any
warrant requirement—is the institution least equipped to measure these distinctions, much
less apply them across different police settings. Cf. Jacobi & Kind, supra note 122, at 810-11.
194. This discussion presumes that the legislature seeks to improve police efficiency. If the
driving force behind precautions is due process or dignity, the same arguments clearly do not
apply.
195. Concededly, some politicians would adopt police restrictions regardless of cost. That
is, they might say, “We should disallow warrantless searches because they are invariably
biased and morally wrong.” Regulation that is wholly divorced from costs or benefits, however,
is bound to trigger political pushback. As a result, scholars often tout their proposals’ ef-
ficiency benefits alongside their rights-protecting qualities. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman,
supra note 11, at 1636; Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1493, 1500 (arguing that Fourth Amendment obli-
gations such as the “probable cause” doctrine improve policing’s overall accuracy and
effectiveness).
196. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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those benefits are and whether to engage in the underlying
activity.197
Thus, the Pigouvian approach explicitly recognizes and encour-
ages differences in policing. Moreover, it mediates the tension
between universal, nationalized rules (which may not work very
well for certain police departments), and more decentralized, local
solutions (which may be undermined or diluted by special interest
groups and local pressures). At its very best, the Pigouvian scheme
enables an objective, insulated regulator to impose a single menu of
fees on a variety of participating police departments. The decision
to set taxes at a particular rate still resides with a relatively
insulated federal agency official, as compared with a local police
chief or state legislator, who may be reticent to criticize or harm his
own police department.198 At the same time, the taxation approach
permits a fair amount of discretion for the local police department
and its citizens to decide how to respond to a given tax. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Fourth Amendment context
also highlights corrective taxation’s drawbacks. Variance, for
example, is clearly a problem.199 If City A’s frisks are, on balance,
significantly less prone to constitutional violation than City B’s
frisks, it makes no sense to charge both cities the same fee per frisk.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to overcome these problems by
devising categories of risk, assuming regulators can identify and
credibly observe the characteristics that distinguish police depart-
ments.200 
In sum, a Fourth Amendment corrective tax scheme appears
promising, but the devil lies in the details. Can a regulator devise
a schedule of fees that accurately prices the risk and harm associ-
ated with Fourth Amendment violations? I address this question at
length in Parts III and IV.
197. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
198. To be sure, the regulator’s calculation of risk and harm should be transparent and
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Still, one would expect the regulator to be less
prone to the populist and special interest pressures that pervade local-level politics. Cf. Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1924-25 (2001).
199. See supra Part II.B.2.
200. See Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680.
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III: PRICING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE PROPOSAL
This Part develops the proposal for a Fourth Amendment pricing
instrument. Section A lays out the proposal and walks the reader
through its basic components. Sections B and C address several
questions regarding the implementation of the regime, notably the
program’s optimal scope and level of specialization. Finally, Section
D analyzes several of the scheme’s particular benefits. 
A. The Proposal
Consider for a moment the types of searches a typical city police
department engages in over the course of a year. The department’s
police officers obtain and execute search warrants; seek the consent
of individuals to search their property and persons; stop and search
automobiles thought to contain contraband or evidence of criminal
activity; stop and frisk individuals for whom there is reasonable
suspicion to think “criminal activity is afoot”201 and who are thought
to be “armed and dangerous”;202 and search individuals (and some-
times cars)203 incident to arrest.204 
Imagine further a federal agency (Agency) that is responsible for
devising and publishing a schedule of fees for each of the search
activities described above. The fees reflect the following: (a) the risk
that a particular search conceals a purposeful violation by one or
more of a police department’s officers; and (b) the harm caused by
such violations.205 Assume further that fees can be adjusted
somewhat to take into account a city’s size, as one would expect the
police overseeing a very large city to engage in far more search
activity than the police who patrol a midsized town.206
201. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
202. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
203. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
205. I explore more fully in Part III.B whether the tax should reflect solely purposeful
violations of the Fourth Amendment, or all violations, regardless of the officer’s mens rea.
206. Thus, one might devise an adjustment in the tax that accounted for population.
Whether and how one might go about creating this adjustment lies outside the scope of this
Article. Cf. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 270 (2007) (deriving “regulatory
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For cities of roughly the same population, the initial fee calcula-
tion is fairly straightforward: the volume of search activity,
multiplied by the risk that each intrusion involves intentional
violations of law. The fee could either be linear, or it could be
progressive, to reflect precipitous jumps in risk. For example, a
regulator might conclude that as soon as a city’s stop and frisks
exceed a certain amount, the risk of unconstitutional behavior rises
very quickly.207 Accordingly, we might construct a schedule that
charges the 50,000th search a much higher per-unit fee than the
5000th search. 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the police department’s
baseline fee is a product of both the volume and varieties of search
activity its officers undertake. If the department wishes to reduce
this baseline fee, it can either perform fewer searches overall or
shift its portfolio of searches from one type of search category to a
less risky search category.
Like strict liability itself, this Pigouvian approach transparently
presumes a correlation between volume and police misconduct.208 All
things being equal, a city that performs 500,000 frisks in a given
period creates more risk than one that performs just 100,000.209
New York City’s experience with its stop-question-frisk program
(SQF) in the wake of the Floyd litigation supports this intuition.210
The litigation’s aim was to reduce unconstitutional behavior, and
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has reduced its
annual frisks by the hundreds of thousands.211 If one believes
intensity” figure by, among other things, calculating “regulatory personnel as a percentage
of total population”).
207. Again, the actual tipping point may vary depending on the size and population of the
city.
208. To the extent other factors matter, I take them up in Part III.C.
209. Cf. Huq, supra note 19, at 243 (suggesting that police errors increase with “the scale
of criminal justice institutions”).
210. Floyd v. City of New York resulted in a federal finding that the NYPD had engaged
in a pattern and practice of violating the Fourth Amendment as well as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 302 F.R.D. 69, 77 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing years of
litigation and length of trial), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir.
2014). For further discussion of this litigation, see Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following
the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 54-
55 (2015); and Meares, supra note 28, at 159-60.
211. See Meares, supra note 28, at 160. This is certainly true in terms of absolute numbers. 
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volume played a big role in perpetrating risk and harm, the
reduction in volume is salutary. 
In addition to recognizing the correlation between volume and
risk, the Pigouvian approach recognizes distinctions in different
types of search activity. Fourth Amendment doctrine bluntly divides
the world between warrantless activity and searches blessed in
advance by an impartial magistrate.212 Such a division is (arguably)
justified by the Fourth Amendment’s language,213 but there exists
no independent reason for treating different types of warrantless
searches as equivalents for purposes of ex ante taxation. 
Under ideal conditions, a regulator would create a schedule that
lists the various categories of searches and ranks them according to
their vulnerability to police misconduct. Based on this ordinal
ranking (which one might commit to upon receiving feedback
through a notice-and-comment process), the regulator could then
devise a fee schedule, charging a higher price for the riskier
categories and a lower price for the less risky ones. Table A below
provides an intentionally simplistic version of that fee schedule.
Table A
Type of Search/Seizure Cost Per Unit of Activity
Stop-and-Frisk $5.00
Abandonment/Consent $4.00
Search Incident to Arrest $3.00
Automobile search $2.00
Warrant $0.00
Notably, Table A assigns the stop-and-frisk a value of five dollars
per unit of activity and assigns the search warrant no cost whatso-
ever. These are purely arbitrary values, provided only as examples.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the regulator would be her
calculation of absolute values for each category, which should reflect
the risk inherent in the activity as well as the average (monetary)
harm reflected by a single violation.
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
213. See id.
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Now imagine the above fee schedule were enacted and published,
and updated as necessary in response to new information. Every
year, participating police departments would file with the Agency an
accounting of their annual searches in specified categories (for
example, 250 search warrants, 100,000 stop-and-frisks, etc.). Based
on this information, the Agency would then tabulate the police
department’s annual fee, and would also publish this information,
enabling the public to track Fourth Amendment performance over
time and across cities. 
So, for two different cities of roughly the same population, the
base calculation might look something like the following:
Table B
City A
Type of Search/Seizure 
Cost Per Unit of
Activity
Number
of Units Cost
Stop-and-Frisk $5.00 1000 $5000
Abandonment/Consent $4.00 500 $2000
Search Incident to Arrest $3.00 2000 $6000
Automobile Search $2.00 1000 $2000
Warrant $0.00 500         0
Total 5000 $15,000
City B
Type of Search/Seizure 
Cost Per Unit of
Activity
Number
of Units Cost
Stop-and-Frisk $5.00 500 $2500
Abandonment/Consent $4.00 500 $2000
Search Incident to Arrest $3.00 2500 $7500
Automobile Search $2.00 500 $1000
Warrant $0.00 1000         0
Total 5000 $13,000
As Table B demonstrates, a properly designed tax scheme might
induce a police department to alter its “search portfolio” while
otherwise keeping its overall volume constant. As demonstrated in
Table B above, the police forces in Cities A and B engage in the
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same total amount of “search activity,” but City A’s activity is
geared more towards stop-and-frisks, whereas City B invests
greater time and effort in obtaining warrants. Because it imposes
less risk, City B’s police department is rewarded with a smaller fee
than City A’s.214 That being said, if City B eventually determines its
portfolio inadequately deters criminal activity, it can always shift
back to a portfolio similar to City A. If it does so, however, it will
have to justify the additional risk (and cost) to its citizens.
B. Design Challenge I: Scope
The preceding Section laid out the core components of a corrective
Fourth Amendment tax scheme. To recap:
(1) Participating police departments would tabulate and
report prescribed search activities; 
(2) Regulators would estimate the risk and costs of Fourth
Amendment violations associated with such search activity; and
(3) Regulators would charge police departments fees reflecting
expected harm, and release such information to the general
public.
Beyond these core components, regulators would confront an
array of design questions, among them the program’s optimal scope
and the extent to which factors other than volume ought to matter.
The present Section addresses the program’s scope; the following
Section takes up its optimal degree of specialization.
Scope-related concerns occupy several dimensions. One can
imagine questions regarding the type of activity, the sovereign, and
the type of government officials whose activities would be subject to
such a scheme. 
Several principles guide these inquiries. Foremost among them
is the trade-off between the breadth and efficiency of administrative
programs. Comprehensive regimes cover more people and activity
214. Another way to think of it is this: the federal agency, by charging a lesser or negligible
fee for warrants, effectively compensates the local police force for the additional time its
officers must spend preparing and securing warrants. 
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but also increase the regime’s complexity and administrative costs.
More importantly, they also increase the likelihood of variance.215 
With these concerns in mind, consider the following scope-related
issues.
1. Type of Violation and Culpability
Tracking the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, a regulator
might limit the scheme to purposeful or knowing violations of the
Fourth Amendment.216 Under this restriction, Fourth Amendment
activity fees would reflect the likelihood that officers purposely or
knowingly violate well-known rules of constitutional procedure. The
scheme would not take into account unintentional violations caused
by bureaucratic mistakes or changes in law. 
Why construct the tax so narrowly? First, because officers who
willfully ignore the Supreme Court’s constitutional pronouncements
pose the greatest threat to the criminal justice system’s underlying
legitimacy.217 Willful transgressions of constitutional law, partic-
ularly when accompanied by perjury or the filing of fraudulent affi-
davits,218 present a greater threat to our polity than the clerical
employee who fails to double-check an arrest database,219 or the
officer who conducts a search according to extant precedent over-
turned while the case is on appeal.220
Narrowing the tax scheme to culpable behavior also helpfully
untethers it from changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Regula-
215. See supra Part II.B.2.
216. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
217. This has been the Supreme Court’s argument for not applying exclusion. See Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011) (“The officers ... did not violate Davis’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence.... Unless the exclusionary rule
is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application in this case.”); Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (“[W]hen police mistakes are the result of
negligence ... rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,
any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907-08 (1984))).
One can disagree with the Court’s decision regarding exclusion but still hew to a culpability
requirement—at least as an initial matter—for a proposed regulatory scheme. 
218. On the accompaniment of perjury and false affidavits with Fourth Amendment
violations, see Armacost, supra note 49, at 468.
219. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 136-37.
220. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 231-32.
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tors need not worry about violations that occur in the shadow of new
legal developments, which in any event would be exceedingly dif-
ficult to price. To put it another way, when law is uncertain and
subject to change, it may be easier to analyze the risk of intentional
misconduct than it is to analyze the risk of accidental violations of
law.
2. Policing Activities
A related question is which “activities” should be included in the
scheme. Should the scheme assess a fee for every type of policing
imaginable (for example, traffic tickets), or should it limit itself to
several of the most identifiable types of policing? One need not
answer this question definitively, but several points are clear. The
regime ought to cover the major categories of search activity that
are most frequent, that are known for masking behavior, and that
are distinct enough from each other that the scheme avoids double
counting. 
For example, it seems quite likely that the regime would cover the
“stop-and-frisk,” which has become both a mainstay of modern
policing and a source of great criticism.221 One would also expect the
regime to cover automobile searches, so-called consent searches, and
seizures of property pursuant to “plain view” or abandonment.222
Searches undertaken incident to arrest might also be included, since
that doctrine fuels a large portion of the searches that officers
perform.223 And one would expect the regime to address searches
based on warrants, even if the regime declared such searches “free”
of charge.224
221. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 77 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d in part, appeal
dismissed in part, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Fagan & Geller, supra note 210, at
53-55.
222. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Richard G. Schott, The Supreme Court Reexamines Search Incident to Lawful
Arrest, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2009, at 22, http://www.aele.org/losleb2009-07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAQ3-CPVE].
224. Given the time it takes to secure a warrant, one might blanch at the claim that it is
“free.” Cf. Light, supra note 131, at 514 (explaining ways in which a paperwork requirement
can constitute a quasi-tax).
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3. Law Enforcement Agencies and Law Enforcement Officials
To which governments and/or government officials should such a
program extend? One might prefer the broadest program possible,
given that federal officials often collaborate with state and local
police forces on matters of joint interest, such as narcotics traffick-
ing and terrorism.225 Otherwise, one might find oneself with the very
“silver platter” problems (whereby one police officer hands the
tainted evidence to another “on a silver platter”) that prompted the
Supreme Court to expand the exclusionary rule in decisions such as
Elkins v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio.226
Silver platter problems rightfully trigger concern, but there exist
a host of good reasons to limit the program to local or municipal
police departments of some minimum size. First, the larger and
more dissimilar the pool of regulated entities, the more intractable
the variance problem. It is one thing to analyze Fourth Amendment
risks posed by metropolitan and local police departments.227 It is
quite another to compare those departments to a rural sheriff’s of-
fice, an investigatory division of the state Attorney General, or a
225. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 17, at 887-88; Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in
2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1396 (2008)
(highlighting the “[t]he extent to which federal enforcement authority has been leveraged or
outsourced through task forces, deputization, or other formal or informal mechanisms of
collaboration with the local police”). Federal-local collaboration has a long history. In Elkins
v. United States, the Supreme Court praised the “entirely commendable practice of state and
federal agents to cooperate with each other in the investigation and detection of criminal
activity.” 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960). For further historical context, see generally Daniel C.
Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 BOUN-
DARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS (2000).
226. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state
courts); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208 & n.2, 223 (quoting Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79
(1949), as the source of the “silver platter” label, and prohibiting the introduction of fruit of
a state officer’s illegal search in federal court). Silver platter problems endure in various
forms. See generally David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter
Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 16-18 (2012); Wayne A. Logan, Essay, Dirty Silver Platters: The
Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293, 309,
328-29 (2013).
227. For research and reporting purposes, the FBI already groups police departments into
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan departments of certain sizes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Area Definitions, in UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/
area-definitions/areadefinitions_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F55V-FLZF].
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federal law enforcement agency.228 Accordingly, a regulator would
be well advised to exclude smaller and more esoteric law enforce-
ment agencies.229 
A related question is whether the program should cover searches
solely by police officers.230 State and local officials as varied as hos-
pital workers,231 principals,232 teachers,233 and assessors234 perform
searches and seizures. Should we tax their Fourth Amendment
activity as well?
Here again, the narrow approach outperforms the broader one.
Police officers differ profoundly from other government officials.235
Police departments routinely assess their officers’ productivity to as-
sess eligibility for promotion and other work-related benefits.236 As
228. The expansion of the program to federal personnel also complicates the program’s
constitutional analysis. A corrective tax program aimed at state and municipal police agencies
invokes federalism concerns. See discussion supra Part III.A. As applied to federal enforce-
ment agencies, the program arguably triggers separation-of-power concerns insofar as the
“tax” effectively reduces the funds allocated to a given agency throughout the congressional
budgeting process. Accordingly, for the sake of simplicity, and for the reasons described in the
text, I assume the program would apply only to municipal and county police departments that
meet some minimum size requirement. 
229. The FBI already maintains a database collecting all known law enforcement agencies,
their relative sizes, and the populations they serve. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at tbl.70 (2012),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table_70_full-
time_law_enforcement_employees_by_region_and_geographic_division_by_population_gro
up_number_and_rate_per_1000_inhabitants_2011.xls [https://perma.cc/TRH7-QQCF].
230. For a national definition of “law enforcement officer,” as used by the FBI, see U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Police Employees, in UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/police-employee-data [https://perma.cc/4CTW-X4TK]. 
231. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001) (holding that a state hospital’s
staff members “are government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment ...
[and] the urine tests conducted by those staff members were indisputably searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
232. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (applying the Fourth Amendment to
a vice principal’s search of a student’s purse).
233. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995) (analyzing a school’s drug
testing policy under the Fourth Amendment).
234. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment
to a health inspector’s administrative search).
235. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Decriminalization, Regulation, Privatization: A Response
to Professor Natapoff, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 12-13 (2016) (observing differences in
approaches).
236. “[N]othing in the NYPD’s policy prevents a supervisor from continually demanding
more activity from an officer to ‘maximize employee performance.’” Nathaniel Bronstein,
Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the CompStat Era, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
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a result, police officers experience unique pressures to boost their
search volume, even in jurisdictions that formally prohibit mini-
mum search quotas.237 High school principals may worry about their
students’ test scores, but it is doubtful they worry about the number
of locker searches their teachers perform in a given year.238 Accord-
ingly, one would expect a regulator to limit the regime to police
officers.
C. Design Challenge II: Specialization
The second and more difficult design challenge is the regime’s
degree of specialization. Assuming it taxes searches by type and vol-
ume, to what extent should it take into account a particular police
department’s specific characteristics? 
As a procedural matter, one could certainly imagine a scheme
that initially assesses a police department on the basis of its volume
and types of searches and then adjusts that baseline fee, upwards
or downwards, on the basis of certain department-specific character-
istics. To a degree, this would mimic the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, which supply a baseline offense level for an offense and
PROBS. 543, 563 (2015) (quoting Operations Order No. 52 from Police Comm’r, N.Y.C. Police
Dep’t, Police Officer Performance Objectives (Oct. 17, 2011)) (describing the police depart-
ment’s emphasis on police activity as a means of measuring performance); see also Issa
Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633
n.53 (2014).
237. See Bronstein, supra note 236, at 563-64 (arguing that supervisors employ pressure
without resorting to formal quotas). For instances in which supervisors have ignored
antiquota laws, see David Clark, “Stop and Frisk” Under Floyd v. City of New York: The
Difficulty of Proving a Fourteenth Amendment Violation, 25 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 341, 356
(2015) (“[P]laintiffs’ three undercover officers ... revealed pressure from their superiors to stop
individuals and increase their ‘activity’ with little concern for constitutionality shown. This
evidence came mainly in the form of superiors reprimanding officers for not meeting their
quotas for stops.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153,
164-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing the centralized use of performance standards and quotas
within the NYPD).
238. Police officers present additional risks insofar as they derive intrinsic pleasure from
punishing others. Professors McAdams, Dharmapala, and Garoupa hypothesize that police
officers “self-select” into their occupation in part because they have “more intensely punitive
preferences than those who select into other government jobs.” Richard H. McAdams,
Dhammika Dharmapala & Numo Garoupa, The Law of Police, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 136, 148
(2015) (concluding that police officers “require more judicial monitoring and scrutiny than
other governmental actors”).
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then permit adjustments up or down based in part on the offender’s
specific characteristics.239 
Thus, the regime could build upon its initial volume-based assess-
ments by taking into account specific organizational factors known
to affect misconduct risk. Just how many factors the scheme in-
corporates is an important sticking point. If it completely ignores
organizational traits such as culture, internal policing, and
compliance, the scheme loses substantial political support, because
it treats well-run police departments exactly like dysfunctional ones.
On the other hand, if it incorporates too many factors, it risks its
own destruction, because each factor increases the scheme’s admin-
istrative complexity and risk of error. To borrow the tort terminol-
ogy, it moves the scheme from one that mimics strict liability to one
that operates far more like negligence. Not only is a “care” oriented
tax more difficult to administer, but it may also be more prone to
error. We like to think that internal training programs reduce
Fourth Amendment violations, but it may well be the case that
“care” matters far less than we presume when search volume
surpasses a certain threshold.
As one considers the debate over search volumes and internal
compliance, one cannot help but consider another factor: race.
Surely, a connection between race and unconstitutional policing
exists,240 but how a regulator would take “race” into account as a
function of determining unconstitutional risk is a question whose
treatment lies largely beyond the confines of this Article.241 Never-
theless, one cannot help but think that a recurring set of character-
istics—the department’s size, the presence or absence of certain
training programs, its structure and prior violation history, and,
239. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. B (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
240. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 99 (S.D.N.Y.) (summarizing an
earlier decision holding that New York City “had a policy of conducting race-based,
suspicionless stops-and-frisks that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”), aff’d
in part, appeal dismissed in part, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014).
241. For example, if a black person is far more likely to be frisked in all major metropolitan
areas, even when holding all other factors equal, we might conclude that such a racial tax
persists throughout most American cities. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
158-59 (1997).
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finally, its racial representation in regard to the citizens it
serves—denote greater or lesser risk.242
How might a regulator incorporate these characteristics in an
objective and rigorous manner? Certainly, she could distinguish
large police departments from much smaller ones, charging the
large ones an extra fee to reflect the oversight challenges inherent
in large organizations. She could also take the police department’s
hiring and racial diversity (or lack thereof) into account, particularly
as it relates to the diversity of the local jurisdiction’s citizens.243 But
the regulator would need to proceed cautiously: a diversity proxy
that reliably reflects the likelihood of illegal searches performs a
great service; however, a proxy that becomes a rule for its own sake
may unmoor the tax scheme from its stated goal of reducing Fourth
Amendment violations.244
Many police departments will argue that despite the department’s
racial makeup, or how many searches it conducts, the department’s
tax should be reduced on account of its high investment in compli-
ance and training. Scholars have, for some time now, praised the
implementation of compliance programs in organizational settings,
including law enforcement agencies.245 “Compliance” ordinarily
refers to a mix of activities, including training, monitoring, internal
discipline, and reporting to outside authorities.246 Police depart-
242. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
243. Assuming she amassed the requisite data, she might also take into account additional
proxies, such as the educational backgrounds of those who conduct searches and seizures. See,
e.g., Jason Rydberg & William Terrill, The Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior, 13
POLICE Q. 92, 110 (2010) (finding a reduction in the use of force among college-educated
officers, but not in searches and seizures or arrest rates).
244. See Fleischer, supra note 157, at 1680 (noting that more specific tax schemes tend to
fail “when observing the characteristics that drive variation in social cost is intrusive or in
conflict with other norms”).
245. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010) (advocating a compliance approach for prosecutors’ of-
fices); Estreicher & Weick, supra note 13, at 951-53 (proposing elimination of the exclusionary
rule in jurisdictions that adopt strong compliance programs within police departments);
Simmons, supra note 13, at 383-84.
246. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 2-4 (2014).
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ments that host strong compliance departments theoretically should
be less prone to illegal behavior.247 So why not reduce their tax?248
The problem with this compliance discount is that not all
compliance efforts are effective, much less undertaken in good faith.
Some programs are cosmetic,249 while others falter due to unfore-
seen weaknesses and countervailing norms.250 Police unions and
police-protective employment laws invariably weaken even the most
good-faith compliance efforts.251 And internal disciplinary units may
already be overwhelmed with their responsibility for monitoring and
disciplining a wide swathe of misconduct, much of it unrelated to
search and seizure law.252 
In sum, although organizational factors matter, it is unclear how
much they matter in predicting Fourth Amendment violation risk.
At the end of the day, the department’s volume and portfolio of
searches might be more predictive of risk than the number of train-
ing programs it conducts or the intensity of its internal discipline.
For the very reasons scholars prefer strict liability over negligence
schemes,253 a regulator might choose to focus primarily on search
volume and type and ignore all other factors, except those that can
be most easily observed and verified.
247. For the discussion of the Middleberg study and its implications, see supra notes 76-81
and accompanying text.
248. The modest discount suggested here differs substantially from Estreicher and Weick’s
proposal to disable the exclusionary rule for all police departments that have an effective
compliance program certified with the Department of Justice. See Estreicher & Weick, supra
note 13, at 952.
249. See Krawiec, supra note 113, at 491-92; see also Baer, supra note 147, at 153-54
(discussing difficulties companies are likely to encounter in validating compliance efforts). 
250. “[E]ven if an organization has adopted elaborate rules and policies designed to ensure
legal compliance and ethical behavior, those pronouncements will be ineffective if other norms
and incentives promote contrary conduct.” Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and
Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 941-42 (2007).
251. See Harmon, supra note 15, at 799.
252. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1634-35; see also Robert J. Kane & Michael
D. White, Bad Cops: A Study of Career-Ending Misconduct Among New York City Police
Officers, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 737, 745 (2009) (examining multiple varieties of
violations that caused New York City police officers to lose their jobs).
253. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24
(1980).
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D. The Scheme’s Benefits
Let us assume that a regulator constructs a scheme that tracks
the concept laid out in Section A, limits the program’s scope as
described in Section B, and incorporates several of the organiza-
tional factors discussed in Section C. Would the scheme capture all
or a substantial portion of the benefits we associate with Pigouvian
taxation schemes?254
The tax regime’s strongest benefit is that it overcomes the detec-
tion problem analyzed in Part I.255 Courts will still hold suppression
hearings, and defense attorneys will still bring § 1983 suits for
outrageous behavior. But deterrence is no longer tied to a litigator’s
ability to demonstrate in court a purposeful violation of Fourth
Amendment rights. Instead, regulators charge fees according to
more observable behavior, such as search volume and type.256
The tax regime is further beneficial insofar as it allows for ex-
perimentation and flexibility. The regulator who sets the fees can
consider certain organizational factors (such as the relevance of a
police force’s amount of schooling)257 as the data supporting them
becomes more robust. Indeed, one of the benefits of a scheme like
this is that it would likely spur researchers to study and identify the
factors that most reliably affect Fourth Amendment compliance.
The tax regime also performs a kind of risk-spreading function.258
It reinstates some semblance of the sanction citizens would in-
directly pay were traditional Fourth Amendment remedies more
robust.259 (I say “semblance” because exclusion exacts an in-kind
penalty whereas the tax is monetary.) If unconstitutional Fourth
254. For the discussion of the Pigouvian scheme’s abstract benefits, see supra Part II.
255. See supra Part I.C.
256. See supra Part I.A.
257. See, e.g., Rydberg & Terrill, supra note 243, at 110 (finding that college education
decreases likelihood of unlawful force but “higher education does not affect whether a search
[or arrest] will take place in a police-suspect encounter”). 
258. To some degree, the corrective tax outlined here functions like insurance, in that it
transforms an “ex post liability into ex ante costs.” Galle, supra note 121, at 1739 (analyzing
behavioral effects of mandatory insurance regimes). On the other hand, the insurance frame
is inapt insofar as the tax scheme purports to charge the department for its officers’ purpose-
ful misconduct. Cf. Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1043
(2008) (arguing for a “compliance insurance” product that would insure corporations’ vicarious
liability risk, even though state laws prohibit insurance of intentional violations).
259. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Amendment activity is most often concentrated in poor or racial
minority communities,260 the tax scheme partially reverses the well-
documented “racial tax” by spreading policing costs across the entire
polity.261 Granted, none of this, in and of itself, eliminates racially
biased policing262 or the stigma it generates.263 Nevertheless, the
imposition of a yearly fee forces citizens, who have heretofore not
been subject to that tax, to at least recognize the police-related costs
that a fraction of the city’s residents experience on a daily basis. 
In the same vein, the scheme’s timing is a notable improvement
over the traditional remedies, whose penalties often arise long after
the conduct in question has taken place.264 Rational policymakers
can ignore the potential risks associated with aggressive policing
when its associated costs come due, if at all, sometime in the distant
future.265 
For a concrete demonstration of this problem, one need only
perform a Google search for “ClaimStat,” the clever, if relatively
obscure, website that is the brainchild of Scott Stringer, the elected
260. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that
New York City had adopted a policy of “indirect racial profiling,” which “resulted in the
disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause”); Meares, supra note 28, at 175 (observing that the “burden falls
disproportionately on racial minorities”). 
261. KENNEDY, supra note 241, at 159. 
262. The relationship between the Fourth Amendment and racial profiling is complex. On
one hand, the police officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions” are irrelevant to probable cause
considerations. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Accordingly, where probable
cause is present, the racially biased search violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, but not the Fourth. Id. At the same time, racial profiling might cause a
police officer to engage in a completely unwarranted search (for example, a stop-and-frisk
based solely on race), in which case the illegal frisk violates both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. For more on the interaction between these two amendments and racial
profiling, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1535-48 (2014); Meares,
supra note 28, at 170-71. This Article focuses on Fourth Amendment violations; a regulator
could adapt it to include equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment where
illegal searches are intertwined with racially biased policing. 
263. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and
the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2011) (arguing that disparate
treatment and “perception of disparate treatment” collectively rob victims of their rights of
equal citizenship). 
264. See Galle, supra note 121, at 1735.
265. Id. at 1735-36 (discussing reasons why various actors may rationally discount the
future consequences of their actions). 
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Comptroller of New York City.266 ClaimStat purports to inform its
audience how much New York City pays annually to settle tort
claims lodged against various city agencies, transparently pitting
the NYPD against its (apparently) more cost-conscious city agency
counterparts.267 Although commendable, ClaimStat suffers several
shortcomings, the most important of which is timing: the City’s total
payout for civil rights violations in any given year relates back to
conduct that occurred long ago.268 Thus, at least where policing is
concerned, ClaimStat arguably criticizes today’s public officials for
yesterday’s policies.
The proposed tax scheme avoids ClaimStat’s weaknesses by
closing the temporal gap between policing policy and the payment
of its violation-related costs. Instead of waiting for harm to surface,
the tax scheme assesses each participating police department a fee
in the same year that police chiefs and other managers articulate
their search policy.269 Thus, citizens are better able to comprehend
the link between policing policy and its attendant costs. Moreover,
insofar as the program releases information for all participating
police departments, it empowers interested citizen groups. It allows
them to compare cities and track their locality’s annual fees over
time. 
Accordingly, the scheme enables a police department and its
citizens to engage in a more informed—and more public—type of
negotiated risk management.270 Risk assessment is hardly a new
concept;271 federal enforcers often demand risk-oriented reforms
266. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, CLAIMSTAT: PROTECTING CITIZENS AND SAVING
TAXPAYER DOLLARS (2015), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/claimstat [https://perma.cc/
WL3V-3NZ7].
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. For a discussion on how Piguovian taxation alleviates temporal enforcement issues,
see supra Part II.A.2.
270. ClaimStat also places itself in that category, although, for the reasons I argue in the
text, it is doubtful how well a program can manage risk when the claims at issue are tempor-
ally divorced from the decisions that generate them. For more on ClaimStat, see OFFICE OF
THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, CLAIMSTAT: PROTECTING CITIZENS AND SAVING TAXPAYER DOLLARS
1 (2014), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ClaimStat.pdf [https://perma.
cc/AC5X-KDYC] (criticizing New York’s reluctance to embrace “data-driven risk-management
techniques”).
271. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 171, 172-73 (2012).
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from local departments as a condition of settlement.272 The tax
regime proposed in this Article not only implements and encourages
risk management on a much grander scale, but also invites its
citizens’ participation.273
At the same time, while universalizing the focus on risk, the
scheme intentionally preserves flexibility among police depart-
ments.274 Although the program can be used to flag (and, when
appropriate, criticize) emerging trends, it stops short of directly
telling police departments what to do.
Finally, by leaving intact the police department’s discretion to
shape its policing policy (provided its citizens are willing and able
to pay the requisite tax), the program bears some of the “localism”
attributes that scholars have approvingly cited in studies of coopera-
tive federal-local regimes.275 The scheme universalizes and national-
izes data collection and fees, but leaves communities with final
decision-making authority over their police department’s volume
and portfolio of searches, leaving § 1983 and the exclusionary rule
as important backstops. To borrow the Supreme Court’s terminol-
ogy, the local unit maintains its discretion to set policing policy
while the federal tax program forces it to “pay its way.”276 
IV. PRICING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: CHALLENGES
The preceding Part constructed a preliminary Fourth Amendment
pricing regime, describing its mechanics and tentatively resolving
272. For example, following investigations conducted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012),
eight metropolitan police departments implemented early intervention systems to track and
respond to evidence of police misconduct. See Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation
in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1381-82 (2015).
273. See infra Part IV.C.
274. See supra Part II.C.
275. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1012-13 (2007) (citing increased participation,
communal identity, and bounded experimentalism as benefits of federal-local relationships).
On the strength of localist sentiment in law enforcement circles, see Daniel C. Richman,
Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 757, 807-06 (1999) (observing those “deep-seated political norms” that cause federal
legislators to respect “locally based law enforcement” systems).
276. Cf. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (identifying those instances in
which the exclusionary rule is able to “pay its way” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 919, 908 n.6 (1984))).
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some of its most pressing design questions such as its optimal scope
and degree of specialization. The Part concluded by analyzing some
of the regime’s likely benefits, such as its timing and internalization
of risk.
In this Part, I explore the pricing regime’s most pressing chal-
lenges, which deserve discussion but which nevertheless can be
accommodated. Objections most likely to arise include the following:
(a) the federal government’s authority to administer the regime; (b)
enforcement shortfalls; (c) police department indifference to the tax;
(d) perverse distributive effects on poorer cities; and (e) undesirable
expressive effects. 
A. Authority to Price
The federal government’s authority to implement a pricing regime
is the most foundational of the scheme’s challenges. Without this
authority, the scheme becomes all but impossible, at least at the
federal level.277 Fortunately, the federal government can rely on two
theories. The first is what one might call a remedial rule and the
second, a priority rule.
1. The Remedial Rule
The federal government’s authority to encourage or compel partic-
ipation in a pricing regime is informed by the complex literature on
277. Presumably, a state government could “tax” its localities in the manner outlined in
Part III. The federal approach is preferable, however, on both political and practical grounds.
First, the federal agency executing a tax scheme is less likely to capitulate to political pres-
sure to reduce a particular city’s Fourth Amendment tax. See Rushin, supra note 14, at 3213-
15 (describing the federal government’s recent renewed interest in structural police reforms).
Second, local police agencies already enjoy a relationship with federal law enforcement
agencies through a number of federal programs designed to fund local policing initiatives. See
William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police, 15 CRIME &
JUST. 231, 289-91 (1992) (describing earlier federal funding programs). Accordingly, the
federal government is a more natural fit for a pricing scheme than the state, which engages
in little policing of its own (compared to local jusrisdictions) and spends far more of its money
on incarceration than local police forces. See Harmon, supra note 17, at 947-54; John F. Pfaff,
Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants and State Imprisonment,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1594 n.72 (2015) (explaining that “slightly less than ninety percent
of all policing is paid for by local governments”). 
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criminal federalism.278 The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states
the powers not expressly delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution.279 Of these state-reserved powers, policing—partic-
ularly the policing of local street crime—is indubitably a member.280
To complicate the matter further, the federal government may not
“commandeer” state or local officials to enact or enforce federal
programs.281
Notwithstanding the above limitations, Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment specifically empowers the federal government
to enact legislation to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive guarantees, including the Due Process Clause that
incorporates the Fourth Amendment.282 Although the power to
“enforce” does not include the power to define substantive law, it
encompasses preventative measures, provided those measures are
designed to remedy and “correct” constitutional violations, and
employ means that are “congruent” with their constitutional ends.283 
Reasonable people might conclude that Section 5 does not permit
a statute mandating universal participation in a Fourth Amend-
ment tax scheme.284 Nevertheless, the Department of Justice should
278. See generally Geller & Morris, supra note 277, at 246; Daniel Richman, The Past,
Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 382-407 (2006)
(detailing the history of the federal government’s involvement with local law enforcement).
279.  U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
280. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (describing “punish-
ing street crime” as one of the “vital functions of modern government” performed by states);
see also Richman, supra note 278, at 377 (“It has long been a truism that, in our federal
system, episodic violent crime (street crime) is the province of state and local authorities.”).
281. “Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program....
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particu-
lar problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to ad-
minister or enforce a federal regulatory program.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935
(1997) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)). Thus, “the anticommandeering
doctrines protect both state and local governments.” Mathew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The
New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 72 n.6.
282. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
283. “While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must
be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness
of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.” City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (striking down Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
as exceeding congressional power under Section 5).
284. I have spoken primarily of “local” or municipal police departments because the state
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be able to demand participation from police departments whose
officers have engaged in a “pattern and practice” of unconstitutional
conduct warranting intervention under § 14141 of the federal
code.285 The federal government can already demand structural re-
form under the aegis of § 14141’s settlement process; the Depart-
ment of Justice’s settlements already require affected departments
to hire outside monitors and operate internal risk management
systems.286 It would not be too much of a stretch to append an
additional condition regarding a police department’s participation
in a corrective Fourth Amendment tax program. 
There are practical limitations to this case-by-case approach.
First, the Department of Justice can complete no more than a fairly
small number of § 14141 investigations per year.287 Moreover, some
cities might resist participation in a full-blown pricing scheme,
choosing instead to call the federal government’s bluff and force it
to trial.288 And finally, this case-by-case approach is subject to
political whim. Under one presidential administration, DOJ officials
may aggressively open investigations and demand department-wide
concessions and changes; under another administration, officials
may decide to proceed more carefully, or only under the most
unusual of circumstances.
engages in relatively little policing on its own, with the exception of certain regulatory or
extremely complex matters. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law:
What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519 (2011) (analyzing how states
divide criminal enforcement responsibilities between state and local authorities).
285. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) enables such a demand or whether Congress would
have to amend the statute to expressly include the scheme is another matter. See, e.g., Mary
D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by Data-
Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 106-07 (2012) (explaining that § 14141 authorized
the Department of Justice to investigate and sue police departments but not to compel
reform); Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an
Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 25, 48 (2011) (“Pursuant to its ‘pattern
or practice’ authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ has required several police depart-
ments nationwide, including the Los Angeles Police Department and the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department, to reform their policies and practices.”). 
286. See Rushin, supra note 272, at 1378, 1381, 1388; see also Noah Kupferberg,
Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 144-
45 (2008); Simmons, supra note 110, at 392-98.
287. Rushin, supra note 14, at 3192-93. 
288. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course
on Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/
justice-department-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html [https://perma.cc/AM56-99GA].
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Were Congress to use its statutory authority to promulgate a
much broader program (for example, one that applied to all local
policing organizations of a certain size), such legislation would
almost certainly be challenged as exceeding Section 5’s grant of
power. Unless the federal government first established evidence of
pervasive Fourth Amendment violations throughout the United
States, cities would rightly challenge the “remedial” label attached
to any such legislation.289 In response, the scheme’s defenders might
contend that unlike other legislation struck down under Section 5,290
the pricing scheme does not prohibit local activity but merely prices
it. Perhaps these arguments would prevail, but it is undeniable that
relying solely on Section 5 would leave any pricing program highly
vulnerable to constitutional attack.
2. The Priority Rule
Happily, Congress could successfully look elsewhere for support.
Under the Spending Clause, Congress can place conditions on the
funds it disburses to local and state authorities.291 For decades, the
federal government has disbursed billions of dollars directly to local
police departments through a mix of block grants and funding pro-
grams, which already influence local- and state-level policing
priorities.292 Currently, programs such as the Community Oriented
Policing Service (COPS) and the Byrne program place fairly few con-
ditions on local police forces,293 although they do require recipients
to document their use of the funds.294
289. Sadly, this might not be so difficult a task if one takes seriously the findings of govern-
ment reports, watchdog groups, and researchers. See supra Part I.B.
290. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (“[RFRA] cannot be under-
stood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”).
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have power ... [to] provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”).
292. For historical accounts, see Geller & Morris, supra note 277, at 289-91; Richman,
supra note 278, at 382-400. 
293. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-521, COMMUNITY POLICING HIRING
GRANTS: GRANT APPLICATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES COULD BE IMPROVED TO FURTHER
ENSURE GRANTEES ADVANCE COMMUNITY POLICING (2013) (“Since its 1994 inception, the U.S.
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) COPS Office has awarded roughly $14 billion in grants to
support the advancement of community policing.”). For more on COPS and Byrne grant
funding, see generally Harmon, supra note 17; and Richman, supra note 278.
294. The Department of Justice COPS Office maintains a compliance unit that audits
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Could Congress condition all law enforcement funding on
participation in a pricing regime? Presumably not, since a condition
of that magnitude might well be seen as crossing the line between
influence (which is constitutional) and compulsion (which is not). In
NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) that would have stripped states of 90
percent of their existing Medicaid funding had they decided to
forego participation in ACA health care exchanges.295 Focusing on
the plurality opinion authored by the Chief Justice, Professor
Samuel Bagenstos concluded that pressure morphs into illegal
compulsion “[w]here Congress takes a (1) very large (2) preexisting
conditional spending program, and (3) tells the state that if it wants
to continue participating in the program, it must also agree to
participate in an entirely separate and distinct program.”296
In light of the foregoing, consider a modest carrot that Congress
might pitch toward metropolitan police departments: join our
Fourth Amendment tax program and we grant you priority status
whenever you seek funding for certain enforcement-related pro-
grams.297 Unlike a universal mandate, a priority rule—one which
grants police departments priority in competing for future funding
for certain, but not all law enforcement grants—presumably does
not violate NFIB ’s plurality opinion. The tax simply represents a
realignment of federal law enforcement funding priorities: police
departments willing to collect information and pay the requisite tax
receive priority for competitive law enforcement grants, while those
institutions reluctant to do so fall to the back of the line.298 
grant-receiving police forces. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/ [https://perma.cc/B9T2-LKQC]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., GRANT MONITORING STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR ALL
COPS GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS 3-4 (2014).
295. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012).
296. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Viva Conditional Federal Spending!, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
93, 95 (2014); see also Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The
Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 594-95 (2013) (revising tripartite
test set forth by Bagenstos as “sequential” test).
297. To avoid a recursive problem (whereby the funding reverses the incentives created by
the tax), the funding carrot would relate to policing needs that are generally unrelated to
searches and seizures (for example, priority funding for community programs, improved
technology, and victim outreach). 
298. Cf. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000) (“That a State wishing to engage in
certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with
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Thus, one could imagine a pricing regime that relied jointly on
both the Spending Clause and Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 5
to secure participation in a pricing regime.299 The priority rule would
encourage participation from departments seeking access to addi-
tional funding and the goodwill that might accrue from voluntarily
joining the tax program. The remedial rule would require participa-
tion as a condition of settling “pattern and practice” lawsuits filed
pursuant to § 14141. With these two instruments, the Department
of Justice could assemble a viable mix of participants.300
There may be additional constitutional bases upon which the
federal government could ground a corrective tax program, such as
the Necessary and Proper Clause301 and the Taxing Power.302 For
now, it is sufficient to conclude that the government could, with
appropriate framing and attention to detail, construct a program
that would withstand constitutional challenge, if it so desired.
federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional
defect.” (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988))).
299. For examples of other federal regimes relying on more than one constitutional
justification, see Pasachoff, supra note 296, at 631-33, which traces the IDEA power to both
Section 5 and the Spending Clause. 
300. I recognize that problems would arise out of mixing the “priority” police departments
with the “remedial” ones. The overriding goal, however, would be to assemble a viable pool;
once a regulator did that, he or she could subdivide the pool and treat voluntary and Section
5 participants differently in terms of pricing. See supra Part III.B.
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. On the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify
federal legislation “to see to it that taxpayer dollars ... are in fact spent for the general wel-
fare, and not frittered away in graft,” see Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004), in
which the Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing provision of bribes to state or local offi-
cials whose agencies receive in excess of $10,000 in federal funding.
302. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the authority “To lay and collect
Taxes”). For the most recent recitation of Congress’s authority to “lay and collect Taxes,” see
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594-600 (2012). Sebelius involved the
taxation of private individuals who refused to purchase health insurance. Id. at 2600. Insofar
as the program envisioned here taxes police departments, it arguably triggers intergovern-
mental tax immunity questions that fall beyond the scope of the Article. At first glance,
however, the regime envisioned here appears to fall outside its ambit. See, e.g., South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526 (1988) (stating that increased administrative costs do
not transform obligation into “taxes” for purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity); see
also David M. Richardson, Federal Income Taxation of States, 19 STETSON L. REV. 411, 416-51
(1990) (analyzing the history and development of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity).
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B. Enforcement
In order to tax a participating police department’s search activity,
the regulator must receive from the department an accurate ac-
counting of the number and types of searches its officers performed
over a given period. How can we be so sure that participating de-
partments will provide truthful and accurate information? 
Underdetection plagues all Fourth Amendment enforcement
efforts.303 The proposed pricing regime is less prone to the detection
problems described at the beginning of this Article, but it is not fully
immune to them. Fortunately, emerging technologies may aid in the
scheme’s enforcement. Body and dashboard cameras can serve an
important documentation and reporting function when used
correctly.304 Further, they can aid federal officials in ensuring that
local police departments adhere to extant, and hopefully more
common, reporting requirements.305 
That being said, errors will occur even among those acting in good
faith. The line between search categories is often blurry. Honest
police officers will invariably experience difficulty distinguishing
one type of search from another. Nevertheless the greater concern
lies with less-than-honest police officers, who might systematically
underreport the number of searches and seizures they perform in
order to minimize their department’s tax.
Although underreporting reduces the regime’s effectiveness, it
need not erode its utility completely. First, the federal government
could periodically audit the search data provided by participating
police departments, imposing stiff penalties on departments that
submitted materially false information.306 Dashboard and body
cameras should significantly aid in this endeavor, as they would
enable federal officials to use sampling methods to follow up on
303. See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 187, at 937-39 (acknowledging complications caused by
police data manipulation).
304. Wasserman, supra note 85, at 832-33 (describing widespread approval of body and
dashboard cameras from “every stakeholder” affected by policing).
305. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1614 (arguing for improved reporting of police
searches); Kupferberg, supra note 286, at 163 (proposing a permanent reporting requirement
for police departments subject to consent decrees).
306. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 294, at 4-5
(noting that the federal government already audits police departments that received funds
under COPS).
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department-level reports.307 Court records and citizen complaints
can also serve as a useful check, since a department’s number of
searches incident to arrest ought not to be dwarfed by the number
of defendants arraigned on filed charges.308 Finally, in some in-
stances, the pricing regime might require or accept verification from
an independent auditor, although this final requirement would be
far too expensive for all but the largest of police departments.309 
None of this is to deny the obvious: in the face of political and
economic pressure, some police would indubitably undercount their
Fourth Amendment activity. But it is far easier to drum up an
excuse for a search or seizure than it is to hide it altogether. After
all, police officers usually benefit from demonstrations of productiv-
ity.310 Thus, a number of countervailing incentives would soften the
officer’s predisposition to undercount search activity. Paired with
the right mix of auditing and punishment for misreporting, the
regime could eventually become a relatively reliable measure of
search-related risk.
C. Indifference
The pricing approach presumes that participating police forces
respond to corrective taxation by adjusting their behavior in a
positive manner. At its best, it motivates politicians and police
chiefs to confirm and debate their search policies with interested
citizen groups and reform those policies and practices that are
excessively risky. Moreover, because it enables interested citizens
to notice worrisome trends (for example, an increasing tax reflecting
an increase in risky search activity), it promotes the kind of
proactive deliberative approach that reformers find desirable.311
But what if politicians and police chiefs are indifferent to the tax?
What if, for example, political units simply raise taxes to pay the
307. See generally Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 88, at 1794-817 (explor-
ing the utilization of body cameras by police).
308. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
309. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2012) (describing benefits of third-party verification regimes).
310. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
311. Cf. Simmons, supra note 110, at 391 (criticizing traditional litigation-based remedies
because “they offer little hope in spurring systemic change because they fail to emphasize
proactive problem-solving”).
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extra fee and almost all citizens pay without complaint? This is the
indifference challenge that scholars already have identified in the
civil rights context.312 Governments, according to Professor Daryl
Levinson’s classic treatment on this topic, are not private actors and
therefore do not respond to financial penalties as their private
counterparts.313 Accordingly, politicians and police chiefs respond
primarily to political incentives, not financial ones.314 
Levinson’s theory of indifference is borne out by Professor Joanna
Schwartz’s study of police departments’ responses to civil rights
litigation.315 Although police departments can under certain con-
ditions, learn from civil rights challenges,316 in many instances they
fail to do so. As a result, civil lawsuits fail to curb police misconduct;
citizens pay their costs, but political leaders rarely have to worry
about them.317
Would a Pigouvian tax overcome the indifference problem?
Several of its characteristics suggest cause for optimism. First, as
noted earlier, both exclusion and § 1983 litigation suffer timing and
transparency deficits; awards are difficult to ascertain and are often
imposed months or years after a violation has occurred.318 As a
result, they create an accountability problem, because today’s § 1983
judgment may well reflect yesterday’s policing mistakes.319
By contrast, the tax scheme tells citizens just how efficiently the
police have allocated their search capital this year.320 Under a fully
transparent tax scheme, the public can compare City A’s search
costs with City B’s search costs, and it can also compare this year’s
costs with last year’s. Sophisticated observers can study upward or
312. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 356-57 (2000) (articulating the general argu-
ment that government does not behave like a private actor); see also Schwartz, supra note 6,
at 1028 (detailing ways in which information produced by civil rights lawsuits fails to alter
decision-making within police departments). 
313. Levinson, supra note 312, at 346.
314. Id. at 357.
315. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1027-28.
316. “When Departments have policies to gather and analyze information from lawsuits—
and overcome barriers to implementation—these policies can have a tangible effect on
decisionmaking.” Id. at 1068. 
317. See id. at 1032-33. 
318. See discussion supra Part I.A.
319. See supra Part I.A.; see also supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra Part III.A.
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downward trends, track sudden changes, and even attempt to
measure corresponding effects on crime.
Moreover, insofar as one designates it a fee, the proposed scheme
has the potential to motivate local officials who are afraid of appear-
ing overly wasteful.321 In other words, the fee scheme highlights and
renders more salient a police department’s inefficient search
activity.322 Few politicians would prefer to be known as wasteful or
inefficient. As noted earlier, New York City’s ClaimStat program
has yet to attain notoriety among New Yorkers because the public
lacks any way of knowing who is to blame for a given lawsuit.323 A
blunt yearly fee, easily comparable with other cities and with
previous years, is far more likely to provoke interest among
politicians and the citizens who elect them.
D. Distributive Concerns
At the other end of the spectrum, critics might worry that the
pricing approach harms poverty-stricken cities by placing additional
pressure on already strapped enforcement budgets. As Professor
Randall Kennedy has argued, underenforcement visits substantial
and lasting harm on poor communities.324 
The actual effect of the pricing regime on police budgets is
admittedly ambiguous. Poorer cities could reduce their fees by
substituting cheaper searches for more expensive ones and by
eliminating wholly unnecessary searches, as New York did in the
aftermath of the district court’s Floyd ruling.325 Still, for its remain-
ing searches, the city would need to pay its fee.326 Thus the concern:
to what extent would the proposed pricing regime disproportionately
harm the poor?
There are several ways in which a pricing regime could destabi-
lize vulnerable communities. A resource-challenged police depart-
ment might respond to a Fourth Amendment pricing regime by (a)
321. Then again, the characterization of the payment as a fee or tax may well limit its
political feasibility. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part III.A.
323. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
324. KENNEDY, supra note 241, at 163.
325. See Meares, supra note 28, at 160 (discussing the decline of stops initiated by the
NYPD following the ruling in Floyd).
326. See supra Part III.A.
1164 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1103
reducing the size of its police force or firing support staff, thereby in-
ducing crime and unemployment; (b) reducing its search activity in
a manner that causes more crime; (c) drawing resources from nonpo-
licing community programs (after-school sport leagues or family
counseling initiatives); or (d) “self-financing” by more frequently
fining citizens for minor transgressions.327 
A regulator could address this problem in several ways. First, as
economists have long recognized, she could offer the police depart-
ment a subsidy to reduce its searches in the same way she taxed
other cities for the risk they imposed on others.328 That is, if City A
imposes $50,000 worth of expected harm on its citizens, the regula-
tor could offer to pay City A $50,000 to reduce the number and type
of searches its officers performed.329 The reasons for avoiding
subsidies in for-profit markets (namely, that the presence of a
subsidy will draw too many producers into the market and encour-
age an activity’s overproduction in anticipation of a payout)330 are
not particularly apt in this context. 
Second, even if she decided to forego the subsidy route, a regula-
tor could still put in place a number of provisions to cushion a tax’s
negative effect on poor communities. Fees could be capped at some
percentage of the jurisdiction’s tax revenue.331 Regulators might
waive, reduce, or permit delayed payments for those municipalities
enduring a temporary or unexpected hardship (for example,
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans). And finally, states might take
327. See Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, Policing
Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2114 (2007); Eric Blumenson & Eva
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35,
41 (1998) (coining the term “self-financing” with regard to police departments that aggressive-
ly engage in forfeiture and other money-making enforcement activities); Developments in the
Law—Policing, supra note 88, at 1723 (critiquing ways in which municipalities employ fines
and similar measures to “extract revenue from the poor”).
328. On the economic equivalence of taxes and subsidy, see Galle, supra note 134, at 851.
But see Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 801 (2012) (pointing out the numerous ways in which
“carrots” can distort decision-making, despite their superficial similarities to sticks).
329. Notice, a federal regulator would still have to ensure City A actually reduced its
searches in regard to its subsidy. 
330. See, e.g., Marcelo Ostria, How U.S. Agricultural Subsidies Harm the Environment,
Taxpayers and the Poor, NAT’L. CTR. POL’Y ANALYSIS (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/
ib126 [https://perma.cc/QJA8-7LA9] (discussing the overproduction of agricultural products
due to subsidies).
331. I thank Josh Blank for his suggestion on this point. 
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up some of the slack by replacing the municipality’s lost funds,
although this is admittedly fanciful. 
It is worth noting that the tax regime is not the only reform that
costs money or potentially redounds to the detriment of a city’s poor-
est citizens. Were § 1983 suits more prevalent and successful,332
cities would have to spend more money on litigation and judgments,
which would leave fewer resources for the poor. Were police depart-
ments to engage in more stringent self-policing and monitoring,333
such activities could strain or increase enforcement budgets, which
could again draw from resources earmarked for the poor. Were
immunity protections for police officers narrower,334 police unions
would indubitably negotiate for higher salaries, also hurting the
poor. And finally, were the exclusionary rule imposed substantially
more often,335 either (a) more criminals would be released due to
insufficient evidence at trial, or (b) cities would at least experience
an increase in litigation costs since defense attorneys would more
often pursue suppression hearings before recommending guilty
pleas.336 In sum, every effective method for responding to Fourth
Amendment violations could potentially harm the city’s poorest and
most vulnerable citizens. This is not a problem specific to the Fourth
Amendment, but rather, a problem with poverty and how cities fund
their obligations.337
E. Expressive Effects
Scholars have long adhered to the notion that the Fourth
Amendment performs an important expressive function.338 Regardless
332. See supra Part I.A.
333. See supra Part I.C.
334. See supra Part I.A.
335. See supra Part I.A.
336. See Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Econ-
omic Analysis, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22, 23 (2008) (reasoning that “a stronger exclusionary
rule increases crime”). But see Kerr, supra note 30, at 634 (questioning as highly unrealistic
several of the Mialons’ assumptions). 
337. Lee Anne Fennell and Richard McAdams allude to this problem (and the political
failures that fail to address it) in Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive
Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2016) (observing that “‘[p]olitical
failure,’ no less than ‘market failure,’ can thwart efforts at welfare maximization”).
338. On expressive effects generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
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of its actual deterrent effect, the exclusionary rule promotes rule-of-
law values339 and reassures citizens that our interests in privacy,
security, and dignity matter.340 The suppression hearing educates
and shames police officers who engage in morally contemptible
behavior.341 For all these reasons, scholars are reluctant to part with
these institutions, even when they fail to achieve optimal results.
Whatever the exclusionary rule’s actual deterrent effect, its message
still matters. 
Given the foregoing, one can foresee several expressive issues for
a Fourth Amendment pricing regime. Some might conclude that the
proposed regime conveys the notion that Fourth Amendment viola-
tions are permissible so long as the police force pays the requisite
price. This fear would be understandable were the regime proposed
as a substitute for traditional remedies. In his dissenting opinion in
Bivens, Justice Burger advanced an expanded small claims-type
remedy in lieu of exclusion,342 which drew similar complaints.343 Jus-
tice Burger’s proposal, however, held out the small-claims remedy
solely as a substitute.344 The regime described here345 is intended as
a supplement, much like § 1983. It does not eliminate the exclusion-
ary rule’s shaming function; rather, it exists alongside it.346 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 390-91 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation
of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951-52 (1995). For applications in the Fourth
Amendment context, see, for example, Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and
Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
419, 433 (2013) (observing that law’s content and implementation “send messages about who
counts as equal members of the political community and what fundamental moral principles
define that community”).
339. See generally Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule as a Symbol of the Rule
of Law, 67 SMU L. REV. 821 (2014) (discussing exclusionary rule’s relationship to rule-of-law
values in current and emerging democracies).
340. “The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
341. See Sundby, supra note 72, at 260. 
342. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-
24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
343. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 261 (1961) (“Imposing liability on government units ... will
not deter the state from engaging in unconstitutional practices. It may be very attractive for
state officials, acting according to a calculus of police values, to violate now and pay later.”).
344. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
345. See supra Part III.A.
346. See supra Part III.A.
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If an officer’s flagrantly illegal frisk should be captured on a
dashboard camera, for example, the evidence he recovers from that
search will still be subject to exclusion;347 if City A’s policymakers
deliberately ignore a pattern of illegal conduct, they may well
subject City A to § 1983 liability.348 And finally, if the Department
of Justice should collect evidence of repeated instances of illegal and
unconstitutional behavior by City A’s police force, it should still seek
appropriate relief via 42 U.S.C. § 14141.349 Thus, the proposed tax
regime does not allow a city to pay in advance for its officers’ future
Fourth Amendment violations; rather, it imposes upon their
taxpayers an additional obligation, a fee representing the risk that
violations are occurring, but that otherwise would remain unde-
tected and unpunished.350
Opponents might also fear that the regime commodifies Fourth
Amendment rights. Some rights, critics say, simply cannot be
balanced against any cost or benefit;351 to commodify or subject them
to cost-benefit analysis dilutes their social meaning.352 Accordingly,
for Fourth Amendment traditionalists, the discussion of taxes and
annual fees in the same breath as privacy rights understandably
leaves a foul aftertaste.353
Two responses come to mind. First, the term “unreasonable” as it
appears in the Fourth Amendment already presupposes a series of
trade-offs.354 Herring and its progeny further direct courts to engage
in a second round of cost-benefit analysis at the remedial stage.355
347. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 65.
349. See supra note 285.
350. See supra Part III.A.
351. “[I]f the law wrongly treats something ... as a commodity, social norms may be affected
in a troublesome way.” Sunstein, supra note 338, at 2026. Anticommodification arguments
often arise in regard to taboo trades and reproduction. See id. at 2038 (employing a social
norms framework to explain resistance to commodification); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854 (1987); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodif-
ication and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84-85 (1997). For applica-
tion of these concepts to procedural rights, see Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework
for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 2006 n.297 (2005), and replies,
see generally Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 91-92 (2011).
352. Sunstein, supra note 338, at 2037-38 (describing social meaning and commodification).
353. See Meares, supra note 28, at 160 (observing argument that taking police effectiveness
into account “would result in the flagrant disregard of individual rights”).
354. See Posner, supra note 25, at 74-75. 
355. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145-46 (2009).
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Trade-offs pervade modern Fourth Amendment doctrinal law
whether we like it or not. 
Moreover, there exists a significant difference between a court’s
ex post analysis of unconstitutional behavior and the executive
branch’s proactive efforts to balance and internalize risk.356 If recent
scholarship is any guide, the use of a cost-benefit balancing in artic-
ulating police policy is not only permissible, but also consistent with
the ends of preserving Fourth Amendment rights.357 
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a well-known tool, albeit one that has yet to
take its rightful place within the Fourth Amendment regulatory
toolbox: the Pigouvian tax. Professors Masur and Posner have urged
scholars and policymakers to recognize the corrective tax’s potential
across a number of regulatory contexts.358 This Article makes the
case for considering the Fourth Amendment as one of them.
The pricing approach is far from perfect,359 but it offers benefits
currently unavailable under our bifurcated regime of exclusion and
constitutional tort liability. It strikes a reasonable balance between
federal intervention and local decision-making, and between manda-
tory rules and tailored solutions. It empowers public participation
and creates the type of healthy feedback loop that renders criminal
law enforcement more responsive to the public interest.360 It an-
swers Professor Tracey Meares’s call to conceptualize searches and
seizures as the product of policy-level decision-making and not
isolated “incidents.”361 And finally, it leverages—and at least par-
tially corrects—local policing’s relationship with the federal fisc. If
the federal government has been flooding local police departments
356. These are “second-order” questions. See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of
Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 205, 211 (2015) (exploring second-order regulation
and noting that although constitutional law dictates certain rights and remedies, “any
number of safeguards may suffice to protect a single constitutional value”).
357. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 183, at 1850; Reinert, supra note 195,
at 1504-06.
358. See generally Masur & Posner, supra note 124.
359. See supra Part II.B.
360. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing,
97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
361. Meares, supra note 28, at 162.
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with too much money, a Fourth Amendment pricing regime offers
federal regulators a principled mechanism through which to
gradually roll back some of its largesse. 
No doubt, remedies such as the exclusionary rule play an
important role in communicating important values.362 Nevertheless,
our traditional Fourth Amendment remedies leave many gaps in
oversight, in part because run-of-the-mill constitutional violations
are so difficult to detect. The pricing approach is useful precisely
because of its capacity to fill these gaps. A corrective pricing
program cannot possibly solve all of our policing problems, but it can
play a key role in alleviating some of them. That alone merits its
serious consideration.
362. See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
